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ABSTRACT 
 
 
COGNITIVE AND RELATIONAL OUTCOMES OF TRACK- TWO INITIATIVES 
AND TRANSFER STRATEGIES USED: THE CASES OF THE GREEK- TURKISH 
FORUM AND THE GREEK- TURKISH JOURNALISTS’ CONFERENCE 
 
 
 
 
Andreas Kotelis 
 
 
 
M.A. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Esra Cuhadar- Gurkaynak 
 
 
 
 The Greek- Turkish Forum and the Greek- Turkish Journalists’ Conference are 
both track- two initiatives which work on the Greek- Turkish relations. The former was 
established in 1998 and the latter in 2000. These two initiatives have been working with 
the goal of influencing and improving the relations between the two states, each one 
focusing on different aspects of the problem. The Greek- Turkish Forum includes quasi- 
official participants and mainly has an advisory role to the politicians and the policy 
makers. On the other hand, the Greek- Turkish Journalists’ Conference is a process which 
includes Turkish and Greek journalists and its efforts are primarily focused on creating a 
positive attitude in the media and thus have an impact on public opinion. 
 
 Primarily, the thesis examines the cognitive and relational outcomes of the two 
initiatives separately, while it also discusses the transfer strategies that were used by the 
two initiatives are discussed. Finally, a short comparison of the two initiatives illustrates 
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the main differences and the commonalities between the two. Data was compiled from a 
series of interviews held with most of the participants and a participant’s observation was 
made in the case of the Greek- Turkish Forum.  
 
 The results of the research suggest that for both of the initiatives there were 
positive cognitive and relational outcomes. With regard to transfer strategies, the data 
indicate that the Greek- Turkish Forum targets mainly on upward transfer while the 
Journalists’ Conference focuses more on downward transfer, meaning mainly the 
journalists who participate in the Conference’ s processes, but public opinion as well.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
TÜRK-YUNAN FORUMU VE TÜRK-YUNAN GAZETECİLER KONFERANSI 
VAKALARINDA KULLANILAN İKİNCİ YOL İNSİYATİFLERİ VE TRANSFER 
STRATEJİLERİNİN KAVRAMSAL VE İLİŞKİSEL SONUÇLARI  
 
 
 
 
Andreas Kotelis 
 
 
 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Yüksek Lisansı 
Sanatta Yeterlilik Tezi, 2006 
 
 
 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak 
 
 
 
 Hem Türk-Yunan Forumu hem de Türk-Yunan Gazeteciler Konferansı Türk-
Yunan ilişkileri ekseninde işleyen ikinci yol insiyatifleridir. Bunlardan ilki 1998’de, 
diğeri ise 2000 yılında kurulmuştur. Sözkonusu iki insiyatif iki devlet arasındaki ilişkileri 
etkilemek ve geliştirmek amacıyla çalışmaktadır, ancak her biri sorunun farklı açılarına 
odaklanmaktadır. Türk-Yunan Forumu, yarı resmi katılımcıları kapsamakta ve temel 
olarak siyasetçi ve politika üreticilerine tavsiye verme rolünü üstlenmektedir. Diğer 
yandan, Türk-Yunan Gazeteciler Konferansı, Türk ve Yunan gazetecilerin katılımıyla 
gerçekleşen bir süreç olup temelde medyada olumlu bir tavır yaratmak suretiyle 
kamuoyunu etkilemeyi hedeflemektedir. 
 
 Bu tez öncelikle her iki insiyatifin kavramsal ve ilişkisel sonuçlarını ayrı ayrı 
değerlendirirken, bu insiyatifler tarafından kullanılan transfer stratejilerini de 
tartışacaktır. Son olarak, iki insiyatifin kısa bir karşılaştırması yapılarak temel farklılıklar 
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ve ortak yanlar ortaya konacaktır. Gerekli kaynak katılımcıların büyük çoğunluğuyla 
gerçekleştirilen bir dizi görüşme ve Türk-Yunan Forumu’na katılımcı olarak yapılan 
gözlemler neticesinde toplanmıştır.  
 
 Araştırmanın sonuçları, her iki insiyatifin de olumlu kavramsal ve ilişkisel 
etkilerine işaret etmektedir. Transfer stratejilerine yönelik olarak ise, mevcut kaynaklar 
Türk-Yunan Forumu’nun tavana doğru bir transferi hedeflediğini, Gazeteciler 
Konferansı’nın ise tabana doğru bir transfere yoğunlaştığını, yani sadece konferans 
sürecine katılan gazetecilerin değil kamuoyunun da hedeflendiğini göstermektedir.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 Unofficial initiatives which involve citizens from societies or groups in conflict 
have been a popular method of conflict resolution for the past decades. In many conflicts 
around the world, such as the Cyprus and Israeli- Palestinian conflicts, civil society 
undertakes initiatives which aim to bridge gaps and open the road to resolution. These 
initiatives include different kinds of people, ranging from quasi- officials to grassroots 
individuals.   
 
 This thesis examines two of these initiatives which act within the context of the 
Greek- Turkish conflict. The first one is the Greek- Turkish Forum which was established 
in 1998, in a period when Greek- Turkish relations had reached a nadir. The second is the 
Greek- Turkish Journalist’s Conference which was realized for the first time in 2000, 
when a small group of Turkish and Greek journalists conceived the idea to organize a 
conference that would bring the journalists from the two countries together.  
 
 The goal of this research is to explore these two initiatives and try to examine 
their cognitive and relational outcomes. As a second step, the thesis will analyze the 
transfer strategies that these initiatives used in order to transfer these outcomes to the 
policy making or the societal level.  
 
 The thesis begins with a literature review which will define and elaborate on the 
main concepts that are used in the current research. For the needs of this paper three main 
concepts are being discussed. Firstly, a brief literature review is given for second track 
diplomacy including its origins, definitions and practice. The discussion continues with 
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the intergroup contact theory and the conflict resolution theories which explain how 
intergroup contact in an unofficial setting might have positive outcomes. Finally, the 
chapter focuses on transfer strategies as an aspect of track- II literature. 
 
 Chapter three analyzes the research question and poses propositions based on the 
literature review. Furthermore, in this chapter the methodology that has been used for the 
collection of data and also the research strategy for the data analysis is discussed, so that 
it is clear to the reader how the outcomes of the research are reached. 
 
 Chapters four and five, descriptive in nature, firstly inform the reader on the two 
initiatives, by introducing the processes the participants and the issues discussed in both 
the GTJC and the GTF and secondly, discuss the main areas of conflict between the 
Turkish and the Greek State. 
 
 In the sixth and seventh chapters, the analysis of the data is conducted 
accompanied by a discussion on the findings. In the conclusion part where the results 
from the two initiatives are compared and further commends are made. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 General Remarks 
 
 
 This chapter shall to present the existing literature on the main concepts that this 
research uses. The purpose of a comprehensive literature review is twofold. Firstly, it 
familiarized the reader with concepts. Secondly, it provides a framework in which the 
propositions and the assumptions of the research can be based.  
 
For this paper, there are three different concepts that should be analyzed and 
reviewed, since these are the concepts that shape the backbone of the thesis. The first one 
is the notion of track- II diplomacy, which is a part of the conflict resolution literature. 
The second part of this chapter focuses on the Contact Hypothesis, and gives a brief 
summary of how, according to the literature, changes can occur through contact, and 
what these changes are. Finally, the review deals with the concept of transfer, meaning 
the transfer of the track- II initiative level to the macro level. Although examined 
separately, it should be mentioned that transfer is also part of the track- II literature.  
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2.2 Track- II 
 
 
The idea of track- II diplomacy exists in the Conflict Resolution theory, though 
not by this term, from the 1960s. According to Wallensteen (2002), the roots of track- II 
can be traced back to the mid- 1960’s when a problem- solving workshop was organized 
in order to discuss the tensions between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, with 
representatives of these three countries participating in the meetings. However, Burton 
(1969, 1979, 1984) was the first one who understood the power of this fresh approach 
and its ability to contribute decisively to conflict resolution, through unofficial 
communication among high- level representatives of the parties, and always under the 
guidance of a third party actor (Kelman, 2000). The first term used by John Burton was 
“controlled communication”, emphasizing mostly the prevalent role of the third party in 
influencing and guiding the parties to mutual understanding and joint generation of ideas 
that could lead to conflict resolution (Fisher, 2004).  
 
The initial idea of the first “controlled- communication” workshops became very 
popular mainly because they served two quite important purposes. To begin with, the 
new approach offered an alternative to traditional and conventional methods of third- 
party interventions which were based on legal and diplomatic frameworks, and had 
proven inadequate for successful conflict resolution. In addition, the new set- up gave the 
researchers the opportunity to get an inside look to the dynamics of ongoing conflict, 
something that it is almost impossible to be done in an “uncontrolled” environment (Hill, 
1982). 
 
The ideas of Burton had considerable influence in the field and soon other 
scholars of conflict resolution, based on the first design of “controlled communication” 
workshops started to develop the model further. Herbert Kelman was one of the scholars 
who, starting with the standards Burton created, developed the model both theoretically 
and practically, becoming one of the best- known scholar practitioners in the world 
(Mitchell, no date). The work of Kelman was very similar to the work of John Burton; 
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However, Kelman, as a social psychologist, paid more attention to the psychological 
perspective (Kelman, 1999). Moreover, Kelman used the term interactive problem- 
solving in order to describe the new approach to conflict resolution (Kelman 1972, 1986, 
1991). 
 
Ronald Fisher (1972, 1976) built his own generic model of interactive conflict 
resolution by emphasizing the role of the third- party in the process. His model was 
finalized in 1983 when he published his article on “third- party consultation” proposing it 
as a method to deal with intergroup conflicts. The main intention of the article was to 
provide a statement of the major components of third- party consultation, and it also 
demonstrates how interactive conflict resolution is a form of consultation that goes 
through the usual phases of consultation, and carries the professional and ethical 
requirements of intervening in someone else’s system (Fisher, 1983: 320; Fisher, 2002: 
68). 
 
The term track- two was coined much later than the initiation of problem solving 
workshops by Joseph Montville (1987 and 1995), a Foreign Service officer. Track- II, as 
opposed to track- I which is official diplomacy, suggests problem- solving workshops to 
facilitate breakthroughs and promote self- sustaining structural development. It thus 
involves, as a necessary supplement to official diplomacy, the non- official, sub- national 
and analytical problem- solving orientations which constitute track- two diplomacy 
(Azar, 2002: 22). Although initially track- II diplomats were viewed with mistrust and 
contempt by the official diplomats, and vise versa, track- II quickly grew in practice and 
reputation so that became to be considered necessary (Chataway, 1998: 271). 
 
 
2.2.1 Terminology 
 
 
As it can be clearly seen from above, there are a number of different terms used in 
order to describe this approach to conflict resolution: problem- solving workshops, 
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interactive conflict resolution, and track- two diplomacy are just some of the terms which 
are currently used. The truth is that in the literature, usually there is no distinction 
between these terms and they are used interchangeably by scholars. However, as 
Chataway (1998) says, track- II diplomacy is a much broader term including a variety of 
unofficial interactions, while interactive problem solving includes a much more 
restrained range of initiatives. In this sense, ICR includes only projects where a third- 
party facilitator moderates dialogues between significant people belonging to the parties 
in conflict, while track- II may include a broader spectrum of people and actions.   
 
This is exactly the reason why for the term track- II, was chosen for this research 
and later on I shall examine if this is an appropriate term for the current research. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, there is no distinction made between the 
different terms, and they maybe used interchangeably.   
 
 
2.2.2 Definitions 
 
 
In the literature many different definitions of track- II diplomacy exist. For 
instance, Kelman defines interactive problem solving as: 
 
“an unofficial, academically based third- party approach to the 
resolution of international and inter-communal conflicts, especially 
suited to protracted conflicts between identity groups. Derived 
from the pioneering work of John Burton, the approach is anchored 
in social psychology principles, and the central tool for the 
approach is the problem- solving workshop” (Kelman, 2004: 7) 
 
 The above definition emphasizes on the third- party character, the types of 
conflicts which are suitable for this kind of approach and method. However, in this 
particular definition there is no information about the participants, that is the people who 
should participate in these types of workshops.  
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 Ronald Fisher, in his effort to indicate the main characteristics of track- II, agrees 
with the main points of Kelman, about the third- party and the workshop method, but he 
adds some important details. According to him, there is a small group of representatives 
for each side (usually up to five). These people are usually influential individuals in their 
communities and they are asked to participate in an open dialogue which takes place in 
an unofficial environment. The main role of the third party is to encourage the parties to 
express their views and listen to the views of the other side (Fisher, 2004).  
 
 Although, the above definitions cover much of track- II characteristics and are 
very similar there are also different and more generic approaches. Diamond and 
McDonald supported the idea that the contact can take place not only among influential 
individuals, but also among a variety of non- governmental actors, including, for 
example, doctors, lawyers, students, and so on. They chose to name this type of contact 
“multi- track diplomacy” in continuation of Montville’s track- II, because the old term 
did not cover the variety, scope and depth of citizen involvement (Diamond and 
McDonald, 1996: 4). 
 
 Finally, since my decision was to use the term track- II for this paper, I would like 
to give a concrete idea of how exactly I understand the term and with exactly with what 
meaning I am using it. For the scope of this research, track- two may be defined as a 
process which involves interaction between individuals or groups belonging to parties in 
conflict, which act outside the official scene, under the possible facilitation of a third- 
party. This definition corresponds to the definitions given above and, most importantly, is 
able to cover both of the two initiatives that are under research in this work.  
 
 
2.2.3 Why track- II? 
 
 
 At this point, it is important to explain why track- II became so popular during the 
last decades, or in other words why it is sometimes important to use track- II processes in 
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Conflict Resolution. First of all, track- II initiatives offer to the participants an 
environment suitable for fruitful discussion where exploratory talks about the underlying 
needs and interests of the two sides can take place, in a confrontational and safe setting 
(Azar, 2002). According to Kelman (2004), the unique strength of track- II workshops is 
their unofficial and non- binding character which finally leads to achievements, such as 
generation of exploratory ideas, which are more difficult to reach in official negotiations. 
With regard to this point, it seems that there is general concurrence in the field of conflict 
resolution that a non- official brainstorming process can make a contribution to conflict 
de- escalation, in a multi- track approach to protracted social conflicts (Chataway, 2002: 
166). 
 
 Another issue that makes track- II initiatives important is the help they can offer 
during pre- negotiation. If we define pre- negotiation as a period beginning when parties 
start to consider negotiations as a policy option, and ending when the parties agree to 
engage in formal negotiations, or when a party abandons the consideration of negotiation 
as an option (Zartman, 1989: 4), then track- II initiatives may prove to be quite helpful in 
this phase. They can help establish a framework within which the official negotiations 
may take place and also advise the official diplomats on how to assess the viability of 
formal negotiations (Fisher, 1989). Since track- II processes cannot lead to solutions by 
themselves they can provide a great assistance in pre- negotiation phase by setting the 
agenda for the official negotiations (Wallensteen, 2002: 42-43). Other scholars have also 
pointed to the importance of track- II in pre- negotiation (Kelman, 2000; Dupont and 
Faure, 2002), but, in addition, they clarify that the importance can also continue during 
the period of official negotiations.  
 
 Finally, track- II may be a very suitable choice for conflict resolution when the 
conflict includes very sensitive or taboo issues that are very difficult to be discussed 
during the official negotiations. In other words, track- II is accorded the task of focusing 
on issues too sensitive for official negotiations which, as consequence, have been 
bracketed by track one. The nonofficial, informal, and to a certain degree confidential 
format of these meetings gives participants the opportunity to discuss these issues frankly 
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and free form fears that any party might be embarrassed in the process (Runald, 2002: 84-
96). 
 
 
2.2.4 Practice 
 
 
At a practical level, interactive conflict resolution and track- II processes have 
been used all around the world in many different cases of protracted conflict, including 
international and inter- communal disputes. Kelman, for example, has worked 
extensively on the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, organizing many problem- solving 
workshops with Israeli and Palestinian participants. However, he has also worked in other 
disputes such as Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Cyprus (Kelman, 2002). Similar 
work has been done throughout the Middle East with Israeli, Arab and even Iranian elites 
coming together in different settings to discuss threat perceptions and common security 
concerns and to engage in a variety of unofficial “confidence building measures” (Kaye, 
2001: 49). The Cyprus conflict has also been a context where many ICR processes were 
organized. One of Burton’s first “controlled communication” initiatives took place in 
London with Turkish- Cypriots and Greek- Cypriots participating. Fisher also later on 
organized a number of problem- solving workshops in Cyprus (Fisher, 2001 & 2002: 68). 
An indicative list of track- II initiatives organized in Cyprus is given by Benjamin 
Broome a Fulbright scholar who also worked on the Island, organizing workshops 
(Broome, 2005). 
 
In the context of Greek- Turkish relations, a great number of track- II projects are 
in operation. Apart from the Greek- Turkish Forum and the Greek- Turkish Journalist 
Conference which are subjects of this research, there are also many other initiatives such 
as the Greek- Turkish Business Council, the Greek- Turkish Information Society Forum 
as well as citizens initiatives like cultural exchanges, women initiatives, student 
exchanges and so on.  
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2.2.5 The micro and the macro-level 
 
 
As it was made clear by the aforementioned definitions of track- II given above, 
these initiatives engage a limited number of people who can work together in a controlled 
environment. So, the primary goal of track- II is to cause changes at the micro- level, 
meaning the alteration of people who are part of the “microprocess” (Kelman, no date). 
These changes are important if an impact is to be made in the macro- meaning the official 
diplomacy or the society. In the following sections these possible outcomes of the 
microprocess will be defined, and ways to reach the macroprocess will be examined.  
 
 
2.3 Cognitive and relational outcomes in the micro-level 
 
 
As part of this research, potential outcomes when groups of people, like the ones 
under study, interact need to be examined. These outcomes need to be understood, their 
dynamics defined, their limitations perceived and their functionality rationalized, because 
the outcomes in the micro- level are directly connected with the transfer to the macro- 
level. If there are no outcomes in the micro- level then there is no meaning for transfer 
and if there are certain outcomes then the right paths for transfer should be followed.   
 
 
2.3.1 Intergroup Contacts 
 
 
A review of intergroup contact literature is vital to understand and map the 
possible outcomes that may result from track- II initiatives. Intergroup contact theory 
may be used to describe the dynamics that may rise in track- II meetings, as in these 
initiatives people who belong to different and conflicting groups, come together to 
discuss their problems.  
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Most of the literature which studies intergroup contact is focused mostly on the 
positive changes that the interaction of people from different groups can cause 
(Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2005; Tropp 2003; Hewstone and Brown, 1986). 
Concretely, most of the researchers are interested in how we can achieve a reduction of 
prejudice and improve relationships and attitudes among groups through intergroup 
contact. Social scientists have tried to create a theoretical framework on intergroup 
contact such as Watson (1947) and Williams (1947) (as cited into Dovidio, Gaertner and 
Kawakami, 2003), the most significant being Gordon Allport. In his contact hypothesis 
(cited in Brown, 2000; Pettigrew, 1998), he specified the conditions necessary for a 
contact group to be fruitful. The most important of these conditions are that in order to 
reach the positive outcomes mentioned, contact requires an active, goal oriented effort. 
His second suggestion was that there should be no intergroup competition towards the 
attainment of common goals. The third one was that the contact should involve people of 
equal status. Finally, the fourth condition states that there should be institutions and 
norms that support the contact.  
 
Pettigrew based his Intergroup Contact Theory mainly on Allport’s Contact 
Hypothesis, but he added a very important condition that Allport had missed. Pettigrew 
suggested that the duration of the contact and friendly environment can play a decisive 
role in the outcome. According to him 
 
Optimal intergroup contact requires time for cross-group 
friendships to develop. Once we adopt a long-term perspective that 
allows cross- group friendship to develop and the full 
decategorization, salient categorization and recategorization 
sequence to unfold, we can expect striking results (Pettigrew, 
1998: 76)  
 
 
Adding to Pettigrew’s point concerning the importance of duration in intergroup 
contact, Aberton, Shoemaker and Tomolillo examined the importance of friendship to the 
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reduction of implicit and explicit biases against African Americans and Latino by White 
Americans (Aberson, Shoemaker and Tomolillo, 2004).  
 
 
2.3.2 Positive Effects and Limitations 
 
As mentioned earlier, most of the literature focuses on the positive affects of 
intergroup contact. Linda Tropp specifically mentions the decades of research that have 
concluded that contact between members of different groups can lead to reductions in 
prejudice along with a variety of other positive outcomes (Tropp, 2003: 131), such as 
improvements in relationships. Most of the researchers who have intergroup contact 
agree to that (Miller, 2002; Brown, 2000; Hewstone and Cairns, 2001). 
 
However, both the Contact Hypothesis of Allport and the Intergroup Contact 
Theory of Pettigrew have been criticized. Most of the critics focus on the limitation of the 
generalization of the positive outcomes of intergroup contact, but the critics claim that 
even when all the conditions posed by Pettigrew and Allport are fulfilled, the positive 
outcomes are not certain.  
 
While Miller accepts the fact that there are positive outcomes from intergroup 
contact, he points out that the generalization of these effects to the “outgroup” as a   
whole is still under discussion and there are contradicting studies on this issue (Miller, 
2002). These kinds of generalization effects have been described by Hewstone and 
Brown in their Contact Model (Hewstone and Brown, 1986). According to their model, 
the type of contact is divided into two: interpersonal and intergroup. Their findings were 
that while interpersonal contact may lead to improve an attitude towards the individual, it 
is unlikely to lead to a generalization to other group members. Hewstone and Cairns 
make the above statement clearer: 
 
One of the most serious limitations is that participants in 
cooperative contact programs , even if they do come to view one or 
a small number of individuals from the other group more 
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positively, do not necessarily generalize these positive attitudes 
and perceptions. Recent work on intergroup contact is aimed in 
overcoming precisely this limitation (Hewstone and Cairns, 2001: 
328) 
 
Another limitation that they point out is that the process of bringing positive attitudes to 
the macro-level is harder when it involves adult participants. However, it should be 
clarified that the two initiatives under research are more outcome-oriented than process- 
oriented. This actually means that relational outcomes (and their generalization to the 
outgroup) is not their main goal. The primary aim both of the GTF and the GTJC is to 
find solutions to the problems. 
 
 
2.3.3 Contact in an unofficial setting and Conflict Resolution 
 
 
 Having seen the positive and the negative outcomes of contact between people 
belonging to adversary groups, and the criteria which the Contact Hypothesis poses for 
successful contact, I would like to return to conflict resolution literature and consider how 
track- II contacts are explained.  
 
 Firstly, it should be pointed out that there is an understanding among conflict 
resolution scholars that track- II initiatives have, or should have, a positive impact on 
cognitive outcomes and relations among people who participate in them.   
  
“The participants speak only for themselves- not under instruction 
from government and other political authority. They are free to 
explore a broad range of ideas that they come to believe- as a result 
of listening to each other- are important. Often these are ideas that 
underlie or reach beyond present relationships. As participants 
exchange ideas the talk is increasingly characterized by its 
interactive quality- they learn to talk, to think, to work together on 
problems and relationships of importance to all the group rather 
than only exchanging formal positions on agreed agenda items” 
(Saunders et al, 2000: 291) 
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  Since, the participants are “free to explore a broad range of ideas” they may 
acquire new learning and this may have a direct impact on the relationships.  There is 
confidence that the ways the interactive conflict resolution workshops are designed, the 
participants have the chance to acquire new learning in many different levels. Moreover, 
these cognitive changes are not just an outcome of the workshops, but as Kelman says it 
is the actual goal of these workshops to promote change in the participants through face- 
to- face interaction in small groups (Kelman, 2000). 
 
 A very serious effort to operationalize the new learning in track- II processes has 
been made by Nadim Rouhana (2000). Rouhana gives examples of different types of 
learning such as changing societal beliefs about the other party, the examination and 
learning of the other’s political needs, learning about political concerns and constrains 
etc. These types of changes can be referred to as cognitive outcomes, since they are 
strongly associated with new learning that takes place on many levels. However, in 
Rouhana’s work we can distinguish a different type of change that might take place in 
track- II processes. These are changes which are not connected with learning but with the 
relations between the participants. For instance, changing the enemy image, which is 
considered by Rouhana one of the micro- objectives of the problem solving workshop, 
can go under the relational outcomes of track- II processes. The differentiation of 
cognitive and relational outcomes is further emphasized by d’Estree et. al. (2001). In their 
effort to create a sufficient evaluation model for track two they created a chart with four 
different dimensions of evaluation. The first two refer to cognitive and relational 
outcomes respectively. Concretely, in the first category, which is called ‘changes in 
representation’, there are issues like new learning and integrative framing. In the second 
which is titled ‘changes in relation’ there are issues such as improvement in relational 
climate and empathy. 
 
Another relational change that Kelman gives a lot importance to, is the generation 
of trust among the participants of problem- solving workshops. Beginning with the 
argument that since the parties are in conflict, mistrust among the participants is the most 
likely situation that a facilitator will encounter in a track- II initiative, he continues by 
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outlining methods according to which distrust can substitute trust, and how important is 
this replacement for the success of the initiative (Kelman, 2004). 
 
 
2.4. Transfer Strategies 
  
The above discussion has summarized, the nature of track- II processes, how they work 
and the possible cognitive and relational outcomes that people can acquire through 
participation in these types of initiatives. However, one of the realities that track- II 
initiatives have to face is that, in the end, the number of people participating, or who are 
willing to participate, in interactive conflict resolution processes is quite limited. 
Therefore, in order for the influence of a track- II initiative to be increased, the changes 
generated in the micro- level should be transmitted to a larger number of people, reaching 
the macro- level. According to Kelman (2000: 279), transfer is the actual goal of 
interactive problem solving and the changes on individuals should be seen as a vehicle 
for change in larger social systems, the national policy and the conflict system at large. 
Thus, a big part of the recent literature (e.g. Fisher 2005; Cuhadar, 2004; d’Estree et al 
2001) does not focus on the ways fruitful dialogues should be conducted, but how to 
move ideas from the track- II initiative into practice over a wider field (Saunders et al, 
2000: 292). 
 
 According to Kelman, the micro- process is connected to the macro- process in 
two different ways (Kelman, 2000). The first connection is between track- II and the 
official diplomacy track. This part concerns the transfer which is delivered to the 
politicians or the policy makers through different ways that will be examined below. This 
kind of transfer can be referred to as ‘upward transfer’ (Cuhadar, 2004). The second 
connection is between the track- II level and the society level, and it engages the problem 
of how changes and learning from the small groups that participate in interactive conflict 
resolution initiatives can be transferred to the grassroots level. This kind of transfer can 
be referred to as ‘downward transfer’. Later on, Cuhadar added another connection to the 
macro- level, lateral transfer (Cuhadar, 2004). 
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2.4.1 Upward transfer 
 
 
The question of transfer that aims to connect track- II with track- I has been posed 
since the very beginning of Burton’s “controlled communication” workshops. Burton 
believed that the results of problem solving workshops may contribute to the official 
negotiations process. However, this impact will only be connected to relational outcomes 
without having impact on the negotiating positions and the bargaining process. Based on 
the human needs theory approach, Burton dismissed any change in this area, since basic 
human needs are not negotiable and hence they cannot be satisfied through compromise 
(cited in Fisher, 2005: 3). 
 
Nevertheless, later on, the idea that track- II can influence the process of official 
negotiation through upward transfer of relational and cognitive outcomes from unofficial 
diplomacy level was accepted. As Azar says for example: 
 
Track- II refers to processes that parallel and eventually link up 
with track- I (official) diplomacy. The participation of individuals 
in their personal capacities, and yet with access and potential to 
influence decision makers, is a useful supplement to the work  of 
professional diplomats and political leadership, while also  
facilitating discussion at the grassroots level. Ultimately, all non- 
official processes are aimed (at least in part) at influencing official 
opinion although at first the link may be very remote (Azar, 2002: 
23)  
 
In other words, according to Azar, the upward transfer is embedded in the nature 
of track- II initiatives. Kelman (1992) also stressed the importance of transfer from 
participants to the policy makers, and the help that this transfer might contribute to 
overcome barriers to entering negotiations phase, to reaching agreement and to changing 
their relationship in the post agreement phase (as sited into Fisher, 2005: 4). 
  
 
 
 32 
2.4.2 Downward transfer 
 
  
Transfer aiming towards the grassroots level as equally important as the upward 
transfer, since its goal is to include a greater number of people from the communities in 
conflict and, thus make conflict resolution more likely. Joseph Montville, responsible for 
coining the term track- II, suggests that influencing public opinion is one of the two or 
three main processes of second track initiatives (Montville, 1987: 7-8). The transfer of 
knowledge from the micro- process to the societal level is very important because the 
initiative becomes a broader effort and thus learning stops being a matter of selected 
individuals and becomes embedded in the society.  
  
Downward transfer becomes a clearer issue in the case of multi- track diplomacy, 
as multi- track mainly concerns people- to- people activities from every component of a 
society (professionals, students, NGOs etc). Ambassador John McDonald and Louise 
Diamond (1996), emphasize the role that the media initiatives can play in downward 
transfer. Because media shapes public opinion and they are the main sources of 
information for people, the transfer of learning can be extremely direct when journalists’ 
initiatives are concerned. This is a very relevant fact, since one of the two initiatives 
under research is the Greek- Turkish Journalists’ Conference.   
 
  
2.4.3 Lateral transfer 
 
 
 It is a usual phenomenon in a conflict that more than one track- II initiatives are 
working simultaneously. Cuhadar (2004) suggested that transfer can also take place 
among different types of track- II initiatives other NGO and organizations, and further 
elaborated on the different types of directions lateral transfer can take. According to her 
proposition, lateral transfer can be divided into transfer to local/regional track-II 
initiatives and transfer to international track- II initiatives. The overall directions that 
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outcomes of the microprocess are portrayed in the following figure (Fig. 2.1) which was 
developed by Cuhadar (2004) 
  
  The different directions of transfer analyzed above are not totally independent 
from each other but rather are connected quite closely. Fisher has created a model where 
transfer effects and their connections are comprehensively portrayed (Fisher, 2005: 6). 
By adopting a bottom – up approach, Fisher starts from public opinion and the learning 
and changes transferred at the grassroots level, by participants of track- II initiatives who 
have the means to reach the mass of society. Following there might be a chance to the 
politicians and the policy makers; this might happen for two reasons. Firstly, the 
politicians may follow public opinion and, secondly, there also might be direct transfer 
from the initiative to the politicians. Finally, at the top of his model, Fisher places the 
diplomats acting within the first track. They are influenced by the politicians, but they 
might also be influenced by the track- II initiative in the case of some participants 
becoming members (or advisors to members) of the official negotiating process. 
 
Figure 2.1: Upward, downward and lateral transfer (Cuhadar, 2004)  
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Figure 2.2: Possible directions of transfer (Fisher) 
 
 
2.4.4. Transfer strategies 
  
 
Having defined the meaning of transfer and examined the directions that transfer 
can take place, the next step would be to look into the tactics that a track- II initiative 
might use in order to maximize the transfer effects. As I will explain below, there are 
different transfer strategies that should be followed depending on where a track- II 
initiative aiming at the macro- level. To clarify this further, there are different ways to 
increase upward transfer to the policy making level and different paths to follow if the 
process is aimed at the society level.  
 
 Upward transfer requires a good relationship with the politicians. Thus, selecting 
the participants who are influential at that level is a very important step for a track- II 
initiative, in order to create a direct link, and this is pointed out by many scholars (Azar, 
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2002; Kelman, 2000; Chataway, 1998: 270 & 2002, Fisher, 2001: 319). Through their 
position, these participants have the chance to influence the policy makers in different 
ways, such as advising, communicating new ideas or political activities (Kelman, 2000: 
280). Rouhana, offers additional tactics for upward transfer such as involving potential 
future leaders in interactive conflict resolution processes, or tring to influence decision 
makers (Rouhana, 2000: 297). 
  
 The selection of appropriate participants is again very important when the 
initiative tries to maximize downward transfer as well. The difference is that in this case 
the participants should be people who are closely connected with the society, such as 
religious leaders, grassroots leaders or people who have the means to influence directly 
public opinion such as journalists. In addition, Nadim Rouhana (2000) says that the 
groups can produce joint concept papers or try to disseminate new ideas to the public. 
Fisher, being more concrete, says that the participants might disseminate ideas generated 
through the process to think tanks, research institutes study groups and so on (Fisher, 
2005: 6). Moreover, extracting from his experience on the Israeli- Palestinian conflict 
Kelman claims that some participants, in particular journalists, columnists, or academic 
analysts, managed to convey some of the learning they acquired in the micro- process to 
the public, by taking advantage of their affiliations (Kelman, 2000: 280). 
 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
 
 In the current chapter there was an effort to analyze the main concepts that will be 
used in the rest of the research. Firstly, the nature of track- II initiatives has been 
examined and a definition for track- II has been selected. Secondly, the literature’s 
propositions on what the possible cognitive and relational outcomes of track- II initiatives 
may be have been analyzed. Finally, there was a look into the different directions of 
transfer in order to transmit these outcomes from the micro- level to the macro-level. As 
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it is made clear in the following chapter the review of the literature will provide valuable 
assistance to the design of the methodology. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 One of the most important issues in a research is that the researcher will choose to 
use those methods that are more suitable to help answer the questions posed. 
Methodological gaps can be one of the reasons that may mislead a researcher to incorrect 
outcomes. Different types of questions desire different types of methodologies. Once, the 
methods to be applied have been chosen they should be followed to the end as they are 
the ones that define the design of the research. In the following chapter I will describe the 
methodologies used in order to answer the questions posed, and also the design of the 
current research. Before the discussion of methodology I will state the research question 
and examine any propositions that can be made based o the literature.     
 
 
3.1 Research question 
 
 
 The research question could be stated as: 
“What were the cognitive and relational outcomes of the Greek-Turkish 
Forum and the Greek- Turkish Journalists’ Conference? Which transfer 
strategies were used by these initiatives and how were they implemented? 
 
  There is more than one question to be explored in this paper. Even though the 
research question is analyzed in detail below, one thing I would like to clarify is that 
essentially there are two different issues addressed; the changes, meaning the cognitive 
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outcomes and outcomes in the relationships, and the transfer strategies. Based on these 
guidelines, but most importantly on the theoretical background analyzed in the previous 
chapter, a proposition can be posed. The proposition applies only to the part of the 
research which deals with outcomes. Since, the part concerning the transfer strategies is 
totally exploratory the decision was to be left without any propositions. As Yin (2003) 
explains if the research topic is a matter of “exploration” it gives the researcher a 
legitimate reason not to have a proposition.  
 
P1: there should be positive cognitive outcomes and relational outcomes for both of the 
initiatives under research 
 
  Both the GTF and the GTJC have been meeting for a long time, and the 
participation concerns people of similar status who have common goals. Moreover, both 
initiatives require active participation for their participants. Thus, it seems that all the 
preconditions that Pettigrew sets in his Contact Hypothesis, the way it was explained in 
the literature review chapter, are fulfilled. Therefore, the results should suggest that 
indeed should be positive cognitive and the relational outcomes. 
 
 
3.2 Scope of the research 
 
 
 The current work is related, as it has been mentioned before, to track-II initiatives. 
Concretely, my goal was to examine the relational outcomes and learning outcomes that 
participants in these initiatives experienced or in other words what can be the gain in 
terms of knowledge and change from participation in track-II/ citizens’ diplomacy 
initiatives. The second issue that is being examined by the current work is what kind of 
transfer strategies may be used from a track-II project, so that it can convey the 
knowledge earned from the project to the macro-level, meaning the policy making level 
or the society level.  
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 The results of the current research can be used in the future in many ways. First of 
all, they provide original data which explain the way the participants in the two initiatives 
under study learn or at least the learning they perceived they have gained through their 
participation in these initiatives. Moreover, the data acquired, through the methods that 
will be elaborated below, can also provide with interesting information about the way 
relationships among participants have changed, positively or negatively. All these data 
can be used in a future effort to create a bigger paradigm trying to explain the role of 
track- II initiatives in learning processes and relationship building among the participants. 
  
 The transfer strategies part of the research is without doubt of equal importance. 
At the end of this research there will be a list of strategies that each of the two initiatives 
has been using until now. Each of these strategies will be backed up with qualitative data 
which will further explain the way these strategies were applied. Thus, researchers in the 
future will be able to use these data in order to aggregate them in a greater model, which 
will use data from many examples of track- II initiatives in many conflicts and identify 
conditions under which transfer strategies function better. The results of this part of the 
research also can offer ideas to people who organize these types of initiatives and they 
lack the knowledge on how they can reach the macro- level. 
  
 
3.3 Research strategy 
 
 
 I believe that the best approach to explore my research questions is a comparative 
case study. First of all, the nature of the questions posed indicates that case study is the 
appropriate strategy to be used. In this research the question asked is actually a ‘how’ 
question in the sense that I intend to find out the different ways (strategies) that track-two 
initiatives used in the case of Turkish-Greek relations. The second question that comes 
out of the research question is a ‘what’ question and that concerns the possible cognitive 
outcomes that these track-two initiatives generated. According to Kaarbo and Beasley, 
the type of questions more appropriate for case studies are ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions- 
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that is questions focusing on the underlying process, on the causal nexus between the 
independent variables and the phenomena to be explained (Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999: 
378). 
 
 The next issue that should be made clear is what type of case study this piece of 
work will be. To answer this question first the unit of analysis should be mentioned. As 
Druckman (2005) states, it is sometimes difficult to identify the unit of analysis from the 
research question itself and in this case the task of pointing it out falls to the research 
itself. In the case of this paper the ‘case’ is not the Greek- Turkish relations but the two 
initiatives themselves, namely the Greek- Turkish Forum and the Greek- Turkish 
Journalists’ Conference. The research will eventually be a comparison of the two 
initiatives and it will base its assumptions on the commonalities and differences that the 
results from the study of these initiatives might have. Thus, since there are two different 
cases being studied, this is considered a comparative case study.    
 
 The selection of the cases was not random. The small number of cases suggests 
that the current research is a comparison study and as such the cases to be compared 
should come from the same class or universe of cases (Druckman, 2005: 211). Thus, both 
the GTF and the GTJC are initiatives that work on the Greek- Turkish conflict, they have 
been going on for many years, they have shown the willingness to go further than just the 
micro- level process and they both include participants who are well known individuals 
in their respected countries. 
 
The last question that should be answered concerning the research strategy is 
under which category of case studies the current research falls. Kaarbo and Beasley 
(1999) suggest five different types of case studies (or comparative case studies), and they 
make this categorization based on how the case introduced is linked to the theory. 
Following their track, I would say that my work constitutes a disciplined- configurative 
comparative case study, in the sense that it uses an already existing theoretical framework 
to explore new cases. The theoretical framework I am using for my research is based on 
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the framework developed by Cuhadar (2004) for the researching on cases concerning the 
Israeli- Palestinian conflict. 
 
 
3.4 Methodology and data collection 
 
  
In order to conclude a research like the one described in detail above there is a 
very specific pool of data a researcher has to look into. The data collected and used are all 
primary data, and the means to collect them were personal interviews with the 
participants of the Greek- Turkish Forum and the Greek- Turkish Journalists Conference. 
In the case of the GTF I also had the chance to make two participant observations, the 
first in the meeting held in Ankara in June 2005, and the second in Istanbul in March 
2006. Following I will explain exactly in what way these methodologies were applied 
during the data collection phase. 
 
 
3.4.1 Interviews 
 
 
 The interviews were the most important tool I used during the research since they 
helped me gather a lot valuable information about the two initiatives. The interview 
protocol that was used (APPENTIX I) was adopted and modified from Cuhadar (2004). 
As the original protocol has only been used once for a specific conflict, the Israeli- 
Palestinian case, there were some modifications to be done. The interview is a series of 
questions which aim to collect qualitative data on how the participants in the two 
initiatives perceive cognitive outcomes they experienced as a result of their participation, 
relational outcomes, and finally, data concerning transfer strategies that the initiative or 
the interviewee personally used.  
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 In the case of the GTF there were a total of ten participants interviewed, including 
four people from the Turkish team and six people from the Greek team. The selection of 
the people who were interviewed was not a very easy task, baring in mind that there are 
some people who left and there are newer members and on top of that there are visiting 
members who do not participate regularly but are invited from time to time. Finally, the 
ten people, selected and interviewed, represent the 93% of the core group of the Forum, 
at least in its current form. The GTJC was very similar in the sense that it was again 
difficult to decide who should be the people to be interviewed. The final decision also in 
this case was to interview the people from the Contact Group, which includes three Greek 
journalists and three Turkish journalists. These are 100% of the people who initiated and 
have been organizing the Conference. The panelists and the participants were excluded 
from the sampling, because most of them had attended only one or two from the series of 
Conferences, and keeping in mind that the second Conference followed up almost five 
years before the first one, there would be methodological gaps in asking these people 
about the Conference. However, this restriction does not apply to the Contact Group 
because even when the organization of the Conference had been paused these people 
were still cooperating and were in close collaboration. An analytical list with the people 
who were interviewed is given by Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Participants who were interviewed 
 
 Participants 
 GTF GTJF 
Turkish 4 3 
Greeks 6 3 
Sum 101 6 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In the GTF there is no equality between the Greek and the Turkish participants; it includes six Greeks and 
five Turks 
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3.4.2 Questionnaires 
 
 
 Nevertheless, while conducting interviews with open ended questions there is 
always the possibility that the interviewees will not give all the information they have, 
mainly because they tend to forget and also because they tend to provide information that 
is salient to them. This type of error is described by Willis (2005) as “non-response error” 
and can lead to biased data. In the effort to avoid this error, two other questionnaires 
including close ended questions were designed which would supplement the first one. 
The first questionnaire includes a list of possible cognitive outcomes and relational 
outcomes based on the theoretical background given in the literature review chapter, but 
also based of Cuhadar (2004), d’ Estree et. al (2001), Rouhana (2000) and Kelman (2004) 
(APPENDIX 2). The second questionnaire includes a list of possible transfer strategies or 
tactics which are also based on the literature (Cuhadar, 2004; d’ Estree et. al. 2001; 
Rouhana, 2000) (APPENDIX 3).  
 
 
3.4.3 Participant observation 
 
 
 From the two initiatives that are examined in this paper, the researcher had the 
chance to do a participant observation in one of them, the GTF. The type of observation 
done can be described as passive observation, meaning that the observer was present in 
the scene of action but he did not participate or interact with other people to any great 
extend (Spradley, 1980: 59). In total participant observation was done in two of the 
meetings of the GTF, one in June 2005, when the research was still in its first stages and 
one in March 2006 when the research was getting closer to its final stage.  
 
 The observation offered valuable help in many levels. First of all, it gave a very 
concrete idea of what the Forum is, how it works and what are the processes taking place 
within its context. Secondly, it was a chance for the researcher to meet the participants 
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and talk with them in an unofficial environment, something that had a direct impact on 
the interviews which were made later. Most important however, was the fact, that the 
observer was able to collect information which was directly connected to the questions 
posed by the research question. In that sense, the observer was in position to take notes 
about the behavior of the participants to one another, and also about the atmosphere that 
prevails in the meetings. 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Data analysis 
 
 
 The data gathered as a result of the research are both qualitative and quantitative. 
The interview was the main source of the qualitative data giving a very concrete idea of 
what the participants think about the initiatives they participate in, what are the transfer 
tactics used by each participant and the initiative as a whole, and equally important how 
they perceive the learning process they have been through and the changes in relations 
with the rest of the participants. The participant observation in the GTF was also a quite 
important source for qualitative data as well.  
 
 For the analysis of the qualitative data there was a need of a codebook which 
would indicate the parts of the interviews that can be used in the research. The codebook 
(APPENDIX 4) includes codes for the cognitive outcomes and relational outcomes as 
well as for the transfer strategies. The cognitive outcomes are coded as learning about the 
conflict, learning about the other, learning about in- group, learning about track- II, and 
leaning new skills. The relational outcomes are coded as trust, friendship, and other 
relational outcomes. Finally, the transfer strategies include upward, downward and 
lateral transfers. After all the interviews were subscribed they were coded with the 
assistance of a computer software called Nvivo. 
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  The quantitative data is the outcome of the close constructed questionnaires. The 
data provided by these questionnaires for the cognitive outcomes helped filling in two 
charts (one for each initiative). Each entry from the questionnaires was added to the chart 
followed by numerical representation of the participants’ answers and also the percentage 
that this number represented as a division of all the answers. The charts are designed in 
this way that the answers from the Turks and the Greeks can be distinguished so that 
comparison is possible. As for the questionnaires which deal with the transfer strategies it 
helped filling in a chart including the strategies that each initiative use and also when or 
how they did it. 
 
 As a final step of the analysis part, all the quantitative figures will be given in 
detail followed by commends and explanations. Afterwards they will be supported with 
qualitative data provided by the coding of the interviews. The results of the analysis will 
hopefully offer a solid base for the assumptions of the current research to be based on.  
 
 
 
 
3.6 Shortcomings 
 
 
 The research strategy described above has created a comprehensive framework 
which led to data that are very interesting for the understanding of track-II initiatives. 
However, there are some methodological concerns that should be discussed. 
Unfortunately, the researcher had no pretest data available. This means that there is no 
data which can show the cognitive or relational standards for the participants before they 
start being members of the GTF or the GTJC. Thus, there is nothing to compare the data 
which is outcome of the current research which can be considered as a posttest. 
Consecutively, as long as the cognitive and relational part of the research is concerned, 
the data provides us with perceived outcomes, meaning that the participants talk about 
changes they saw in their selves in retrospect and therefore, they actually speak about 
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how they perceive these changes at the specific time that the interview was given. This is 
why the word ‘outcomes’ is far more suitable from the word ‘changes’ and the term 
changes is used most of the times conventionally.  
 
 Nevertheless, the data reached from this research is still valuable, because even if 
for example a participant perceives that he has gained new knowledge through 
participation in a track- II initiative, this means a great deal for the initiative itself. Before 
examining what are these perceived outcomes for the cases of the GTF and the GTJC a 
short description of the two initiatives will be given in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE INITIATIVES 
 
 
This chapter includes a description of the two initiatives, exploring the ways or 
reasons that led to their formation, the processes that take place during these initiatives, 
the members of each initiative and the issue discussed. At the end of the chapter some of 
the commonalities and differences between the GTG and the GTJC will be also pointed 
out. 
 
 
4.1 The Greek- Turkish Journalist Conference (GTJC) 
 
 
The first initiative to be discussed is the GTJC. Following I will briefly describe 
the Conference, trying to portray its general characteristics, the people who are involved 
in the initiative and the nature of the issues addressed in it. I will also try to highlight the 
possible commonalities or differences between the GTJC and the GTF which was 
analyzed above. The data for this part are also derived from the interviews with the 
organizers of the Conference, but also some interesting information were kindly provided 
to me by one of the organizers in the form of a memo.  
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4.1.1 Formations and members 
 
 
The GTJC was realized for the first time in 2000, in a time when even though the 
relations between the two countries had begun to become smoother, the media in both 
Turkey and Greece had adopted a quite nationalistic approach while broadcasting issues 
relevant to the relations of the two countries. Before the decision for the formation of the 
GTJC was taken, Dr. Oktay Eksi in coordination with the Turkish journalist Nur Batur 
decided to invite some Greek journalists to Istanbul in order to discuss about the situation 
in the media of the two countries. In this first meeting there were about 15 Greek 
journalists, all from Athens besides one from Thessaloniki and one from Western Thrace, 
Mr. Dede. The idea for the formation of the Conference was taken in this meeting. As 
one of the interviewees reveals:  
 
“After we discussed we decided to make an organizing committee 
of rapprochement with the goal each side to try to remove the 
influences applied from governments or other organizations and 
influence the Greek Turkish relations in order to serve political 
games, and to give the opportunity to the journalists of each side to 
explain to the other side’s journalists what happens in their 
country and how they approach different events because indeed 
there where many things that each side didn’t know about the 
other” 
 
The organizing committee, which is officially called “the contact group”, 
comprises of six very well- known journalists, three from each side. This small group of 
people is indeed the heart of GTJC, as they are responsible for its organization, the issues 
discussed, the formation of the panels and in general the realization of the Conference.  
 
The members of the Conference are by definition Turkish and Greek journalists. 
To explain this part further, I believe it is essential to distinguish three different groups of 
participants. The first group is the Contact Group which as mentioned includes the same 
six people from the beginning of the Conference. The second group includes people who 
participate as panelists, analyzing a specific issue that is under their specialty or that the 
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Contact Group has asked them to present. People in this group are predominantly 
journalists and people of the Media, but there have also been academics. The third group, 
which concerns the big mass of the Conference, includes journalists who have been 
invited by the Contact Group for participation. The number of participants is not 
standard. For instance, in the first Conference, which took place in Greece in February 
2000, the list of participants included 71 journalists. In the second Conference in Istanbul, 
later the same year, the participation grew including 77 Greek journalists and around the 
same number of Turks. For the third Conference although there are no exact data 
available to me, it is certain that the participation from the Greek side was rather poor, 
something which actually had a negative impact on the Turkish side.  
 
 
4.1.2 Process 
 
 
Until now there have been three Conferences held, with the first one taking place 
in Athens in the year 2000. Although, the initial plan was to hold two Conferences per 
year, financial and logistical problems prevented the realization of the Conference for 
five years. However, the GTJC was organized again in 2005, for its third meeting and it 
is scheduled to take place in June 2006 in Istanbul. The duration of the Conference is one 
and a half days, although the second Conference lasted only for one day. All the 
Conferences took place during weekends, and this shows the effort of the organizers to 
attract more participants.  
 
 For each Conference, there are specific topics which have been decided by the 
Contact Group, that are subject to discussion. For each topic there is a panel, comprising 
of three or four panelists. The coordinator of each panel is a member of the contact group. 
After each panel, there is time for open dialogue and clarification questions from the 
audience. Data from the interviews with the members of the Contact Group show that the 
discussion part is very interesting, and also it is the session of GTJC that helps the people 
involved understand the other side. It was also obvious, from the same data, that the 
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discussions were some times intense. The following example as described by one of the 
interviewees is indicative: 
 
“… when the last conference at Athens took place there were some 
people from the Turkish group who were expressing some opinions 
which were a little bit stretched. For example for the issue of the 
accession of Turkey to the European Union they were saying 
things that were unrealistic, that Turkey is a big country and for 
this the EU should accept it. This caused tension in the discussion 
but this was also positive. So there were some discussions, which 
are useful because through personal opinions we made that people 
understand some issues.” 
 
 Beside the panels and discussion sections in the Conference, the organizers of the 
initiative seem to pay much attention to leisurely activities as well. In every meeting there 
are quite a lot activities planned including, opening ceremonies, dinners, talks given by 
officials and politicians.  
 
 
4.1.3 Issues 
 
 
 In each Conference the issues discussed are decided by the Contact Group in 
advance. The issues analyzed and discussed concern the role of the media in the Greek- 
Turkish relations and in general issues concerning media in the two countries. For 
example, an issue discussed in the first Conference was “Assessment of positive and 
negative influences of the Media on the Greek-Turkish relations”. Another example from 
the second Conference in Istanbul is “Organizational and other forms of cooperation in 
multiple levels, of journalists and media executives of Greece and Turkey”. However, 
occasionally there are topics not directly connected with the Media, topics for example 
that concern the European perspective of Turkey. Moreover, there are open discussions 
which are related with the future of the initiative and also discussions which are meant to 
evaluate the work done in the Conference so far.  
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 An important piece of information that should be taken under consideration is that 
there is the will from the Contact Group to expand the issues covered in the initiative, so 
that it also include issues which are not directly attached to the media. A Turkish member 
of the Group answering a question on how the GTJC could be improved mentions among 
others: 
“…we should not only discuss the problems of the media, or not to 
discuss mainly political issues. We can talk about social matters, 
low politics, cultural exchanges, music; all these things. And plus 
the TV series which have been very influential lately. In the coming 
conference we have invited some, not officials, but some other 
colleagues lets say who are influential on the other field, like 
culture.” 
 
 
4.2 The Greek- Turkish Forum (GTF) 
 
 
The GTF is probably the most important track-II initiative working on the Greek 
Turkish relations, and also it is the only group that has been going on for such a long 
time. Since 1998 approximately 35 meetings have taken place in different countries and 
there are a number of different issues addressed in these meetings. The meetings take 
place in a closed environment where only the members and people invited from both the 
Turkish and the Greek teams, can attend. Following I will describe in detail the GTF as it 
has been introduced to me by its members through the interviews and also by using the 
knowledge from my observation in two of its meetings. 
 
 
4.2.1 Formation and members 
 
 
 The GTF was established in 1998, following two conferences in Wilton Park in 
England were 15 Greeks and 15 Turks participated. After the conferences some of the 
participants received an invitation asking them to be participants in a smaller group. Until 
now it is not clear who put the list of the participants together but most of the members of 
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the GTF that were interviewed believe it was someone from the British side. It was also 
the British side that handled the funding at the beginning through the Robert’s 
Foundation and RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) which is dependent on the 
English Ministry of Defense. However, in the very early stages the PRIO (Peace 
Research Institute of Oslo) became involved by offering further funding.  
 
 The first meeting took place in London and the initial group included 7 Greeks 
and 7 Turks. Although the first couple of meetings took place in other European 
countries, the rest of the meetings took place in either Turkey or Greece. At the beginning 
there were 4 meetings per year, 2 in each of the two countries but during the last years the 
number of meetings was reduced to two. There were also two coordinators assigned for 
the Greek and Turkish group. Christos Rozakis, a well known Professor of International 
Law, was the initial coordinator for the Greek team and Admiral Guven Erkaya, who was 
also Admiral of the Turkish Army during the Imia/Kardak crisis, was the coordinator of 
the Turkish group. Currently, both of the coordinators have changed. After the death of 
Admiral Erkaya, Ambassador Ilter Turkmen took the coordination of the Turkish side 
and he is still the coordinator. From the Greek side Dr. Rozakis was appointed as Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece and he had to withdraw his participation to the 
GTF since he was an official member of the Greek Government. Later on he became a 
Judge in the International Court of Justice. Since his withdrawal the coordination of the 
Greek team was appointed to Costa Karras.  
 
The members of the GTF are all prominent figures in their societies. The two 
groups include former ambassadors, well- known professors, philanthropists, advisors to 
politicians, politicians and high- ranked military officers2. Indeed a remark we should 
make at this point is that the people selected for participation in the GTF are very 
important people who have excellent knowledge of the issues addressed in the meetings. 
However, membership is not everlasting. Currently, there are 11 members representing 
Turkey and Greece in the GTF and only some of them were in the initial group when 
started in 1998. These people constitute the core group of the GTF or the Policy Analysis 
                                                 
2
 Not in the current formation 
 53 
Group of the GTF as it is sometimes called. The explanation for this is simple. Old 
members may stop participating because of lack of time, personal issues, or even because 
they occupy a new position that does not allow their participation (as the example of Dr. 
Rozakis mentioned above). New members are invited to cover the empty spot of an old 
member, or if the core group decides that their knowledge could help in the meetings (for 
example when the forum started the discussion on Cyprus Dr. Hadjivasileiou was asked 
to become a member of the GTF because of his rich knowledge on the issue). 
 
In addition, there are many other people who have participated in some of the 
meetings but in any case they do not belong to the core group of the GTF. It is not 
unusual that people with various affiliations (journalists, researchers) are invited to 
participate if they can help the process with their knowledge. For example Mehmet Ali 
Birand, a prominent Turkish journalist, has often been invited in order to explain the 
current trends in the media or to give information about latest events. 
 
 
4.2.2 Process 
 
 
The GTF group meets twice a year, with one meeting taking place in Greece and 
one in Turkey. However, there is no strict rule on this and if the members think that there 
are issues to be discussed the GTF can be organized more often than that. For instance, in 
the meeting taking place in Istanbul in March 2006 the members decided that they want 
to meet again in June 2006, and this would make the Forum’s third meeting in less than 9 
months.  
 
Each meeting lasts approximately for one and a half days. I believe, according to 
my observation that this time- frame can be divided into two different parts. The first one 
includes a general discussion where the members have the opportunity to exchange views 
about the developments which have taken place in the two countries since the last 
meeting. This part of the Forum is a great chance for the members to see how people 
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from the other team see and understand their problems. To explain this further, what is 
happening in this part is that every team explains the developments in their own country 
and then accepts questions from the other side. For some of the members of the GTF this 
part is the most important one since it helps them form a view of what the other side is 
thinking and hence can understand it better. As one of the Greek members says during the 
interview: 
 
“I must say that I find this part of the session extremely interesting 
because this is how you understand how the other side thinks how 
the other side feels and what are its immediate concerns, which is 
very important in a process like this. I also had the opportunity to 
follow different lines of thinking in the Greek side; it is a very nice 
reflection in the Greek side as well.”  
 
The second session mainly consists of presentations usually from visiting 
members concerning a specific issue within the context of the Greek- Turkish relations. 
For example, in the meeting that took place in Ankara in June 2005, Dr. Thanos Dokos 
from ELIAMEP, who was for the first time invited to the Forum gave a very interesting 
presentation on how Turkey and Greece can relieve tensions over the Aegean Sea. In the 
same meeting a Greek-Cypriot, Alexandros Lordos, gave a presentation on a survey he 
had made on Cyprus on what changes the people from both communities on the Island 
would like to see in the Annan plan. After the presentations a discussion follows and 
questions are being asked back and forth. 
  
Although the participants are people with high image and rich background, the 
atmosphere prevailing in the discussions is quite relaxed and warm. Personally, as an 
outsider, I could actually feel the personal connection among the members, mainly those 
belonging to the core group. The participants were feeling free to ask some times hard 
questions in an informal way without worrying being misunderstood from the other party. 
There are situations when voices become higher but everything seems to move within the 
limits of decent and fruitful dialogue. Humor is also present in the discussion with 
members from both sides exchanging humorous comments occasionally.  
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The sessions described above are moderated by a third party who in the case of 
the GTF for many years has been Dan Smith, a scholar affiliated with PRIO. In action 
Dan Smith would almost let the group find its own way through the discussion and would 
only intervene if there was the need to get the dialogue in the correct track. However, in 
the last meeting, March 2006, Dan Smith could not make it to Istanbul and the 
moderation of the session was appointed to Dr. Ustun Erguder and Ms. Polina Lampsa 
jointly. Since, the meeting was one of the best the Forum had for a long time, at the end 
there was a discussion among the core group, if there was the need for a third party 
anymore. Although there were no decisions made on the table, it seems that from that 
point on the Forum would work without a third party and the meetings would be 
moderated from the members. 
 
 
4.2.3 Issues 
 
 
As the Forum has been taking place for many years now, there are a lot of issues 
that have been discussed and different approaches to various issues have been examined. 
During the first years of the Forum, the group had focused on the Aegean issue and this 
led finally to a common paper which was signed by the members of the GTF in 2001. 
The importance of this joint statement can be seen in the words of all the members of the 
Forum. For instance a member from the Greek team says: 
 
“We came up in the year 2000, which is a breakthrough in my 
view, with a document recommending a process for eventually 
leading the question of the continental shelf and its relating issues 
to the International Court of Justice. It’s a very clear view, we 
gave it to the two foreign ministers signed by the members of the 
GTF, as we told them ten days later we made it public. And I 
consider it the golden mean; when you see it you will see how it is 
possible to get Greeks and Turks to agree to a common procedure 
toward eventual settlement of this particular issue by the ICJ”     
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However, after this paper was signed by the GTF it was obvious that there were 
not many things left to do on the Aegean issue. The Forum dealt with other less important 
issues concerning Greek- Turkish relations like the minorities’ rights, or confidence 
building measures. It would not be far from the truth to say that although the GTF offered 
a very good line of communication between the two countries, it was also facing a 
stalemate. As one of the members revealed to me just after the meeting in Ankara in 
2005, “if the GTF does not start dealing with hot issues, we will end up as a bunch of 
friends getting together twice per year having a good time”. Finally, the group decided to 
open the Cyprus issue, an issue that the Greeks almost denied to discuss in absence of 
Greek-Cypriots. In the meeting which took place in March 2006, a number of prominent 
personalities from Cyprus were invited and after some discussion the group reached a 
very important decision which in my opinion gives a different value to the GTF, although 
this was not the first meeting that Cypriots participated. The decision was that there 
should be a Cypriot group which would meet some times per year and would report to the 
GTF. It is, so to say, the beginning of the Cyprus branch of the GTF. 
 
 
4.3 Commonalities and differences 
 
 
 Both the GTF and the GTJC are track- II initiatives functioning in the context of 
the Greek- Turkish conflict. However, the way each initiative is being organized and the 
role they try to play are very different. Following I will try to point out to the main 
differences, but also to some of the commonalities that can be found between the two 
initiatives. The main differences can also be seen in Table 2. 
 
One of the main differences between the two initiatives is that while the GTF is 
being held in a closed environment, the GTJC is an open process where the number of 
participants can vary and under some circumstances it is also open to the public. In that 
sense, the GTF is a Forum with a primary target to include only the members and thus, 
create a decent and fruitful dialogue. This way it can be assured that each of the members 
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Table 2: Main differences between the GTF and the GTJC  
Differences between the GTF and the GTJC 
GTF GTJC 
outcome-oriented  process- oriented 
close format open format 
Third- party (until recently)  No third party involved   
People with different affiliations involved 
  Journalists only  
 Started earlier when the relation between 
Greece and Turkey had reached a nadir  Started after the rapprochement  
 Policy advising group  Decision making initiative3 
    
 
 
of the Forum will be able to say his/her opinion without the fear of the public. In other 
words secrecy is a very vital issue for the GTF to work properly. On the other hand, the 
decision of the organizers of the GTJC is to keep this initiative open to every one who is 
interested. In this case we can actually assume that the number of the participants as well 
as their affiliation would not allow making this initiative a closed one.  
 
 The goals of each initiative are also quite different, meaning mainly that the GTF 
and the GTJC have almost completely different reasons of existence. The GTF is not a 
decision making initiative. Its role is strictly advisory and also some times, if needed, it 
can also function as a communication line between the two parties. Also its character is 
exclusively political. As one of the members says: 
 
“…I am not familiar with any other initiatives which moved among 
these lines. There were other civil society initiatives but this is a 
purely political one. So it is not like Greek Turkish economic 
cooperation board or anything of this sort, it is probably the most 
prominent political group. I participated in some of the foreign 
economic relation board, sub-committee of the Greek Turkish 
                                                 
3
 At least to the extend that the decisions concern the journalists or the Media  
 58 
economic council. But these are economic ones, there are not like 
GTF, they are to promote business among Greece and Turkey. 
They are decision making ones.”  
 
On the contrary, the GTJC is an initiative that can make decisions at least to the 
level these decisions concern the journalists and the world of the media in the two 
countries. The primary goal of the Conference is not to influence the conflict or to make 
recommendations to the policy makers, but instead to create a cooperative environment 
for the journalists from Turkey and Greece. According to the Contact Group the way to 
achieve this is through dialogue and mutual understanding. Through this way there may 
also have been some indirect influences to the conflict.   
 
Another important difference is that the GTF and the GTJC have different 
orientations. The GTF is solution oriented, in the sense that in the meetings the members 
are trying to find ways that would make the resolution of the Greek- Turkish conflict 
easier. On the other hand the GTJC is more relationship oriented as its main goal is to 
bring the journalists of the two countries together. 
 
 Despite the differences we can still find some common ground, some 
commonalities between the two initiatives. Both the GTF and the GTJC are formed by 
people who wanted to see rapprochement realizing, and who at some point they 
understood that there should be efforts beyond the official level for this to happen. Thus, 
we can say that the way of thinking of the people involved in both initiatives is quite 
similar at least concerning the ways the civil society can back up the rapprochement 
between Greece and Turkey.  
 
 Another commonality is that both initiatives engage people who are quite well- 
known in their societies and also quite influential so much for the politicians and policy 
makers, whom with most of them have very close relations, but also for the society at 
least for those of the participants who have the means to communicate with the society. I 
have already talked about the affiliations of the participants in the GTF, but also in the 
GTJC the level of the journalists involved in the Contact Group is very high. There are 
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head columnists and chiefs of editing in top- rated newspapers, directors of big radio 
stations and so on.   
 
 In the current chapter the GTJC and the GTF were described and some of the 
main issues concerning these two initiatives were discussed. Moreover, some of the 
common points between the initiatives were clarifies and their main differences were 
portrayed. In the next chapter follows a brief analysis of the main issues of the Greek- 
Turkish conflict.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 60 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONFLICT CONTEXT 
 
 
This chapter includes a short mapping of the conflict and it gives valuable data to 
the reader which can help him/her understand better the negotiations, the actions or the 
non- actions of the Track-II initiatives under study. I also found it important to add a 
small piece which would describe the developments of diplomatic contacts at the official 
level which happen within the time-frame examined.  
 
 
5.1 Issues 
 
 
It is quite challenging to explain the issues in the Greek-Turkish conflict and the 
main reason is that traditionally in this conflict it is very hard to find the two parties 
agreeing on what are the issues that should be discussed. For the needs of this paper we 
will consider an ‘issue’ any issue that is being posed by any of the two sides. Generally, 
we could say that all the issues can fit under three umbrellas: the Aegean issues, Cyprus 
Question, and problems concerning minorities. 
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5.2 The Aegean Issues 
 
 
The confrontation over the Aegean Sea is probably one of the most complicated 
issues between the two sides as it is comprised of several problems. Even thought these 
problems are connected to each other in a higher or lower degree, they should be 
discussed separately since the two sides have developed a different argumentation for 
each one of the problems. The problems concerning the Aegean Sea that will be 
discussed here are the delimitation of the continental shelf, width of territorial waters, the 
Greek air space and the Flight Information Area (F.I.R.) over the Aegean, the 
demilitarization of the islands of the East Aegean, and finally the operational control of 
NATO in the Aegean Sea. 
 
 
5.2.1 The Continental Shelf  
  
 
According to the definition given by the third UN Law of the Sea Convention in 
1982 the continental shelf is defined on article 76 paragraph 1 as: 
 
The seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas of a coastal state 
that extent beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up 
to that distance.4     
 
At this point there should be some things cleared out. The first one is that both 
Greece and Turkey as states with a coast on the Aegean are entitled to continental shelf 
and the second is that the continental shelf does not in any way imply sovereign rights but 
it grants exclusive rights of exploitation and exploration of the wealth of the territorial 
                                                 
4
 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm 
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shelf. Moreover, the notion of the continental shelf was not known before the WWII and 
therefore there is no reference to it in the Lausanne treaty. 
 
 
5.2.1.1 Positions of the Turkish and the Greek side 
 
 
The problems with the continental shelf between the two countries started in the 
1970’s when the parties started the efforts for exploration of the Aegean continental shelf 
in order to find oil. Greece had already granted licenses for petroleum explorations from 
1963 but only to areas within the territorial zones of the islands or its coasts. According 
to Bolukbasi, Greece was the first to grant license for exploitation outside the limits of its 
territorial sea, near the island of Limnos (Bolukbasi, 2004). The same event is seen by the 
Greek side from a totally different point of view. According to it Turkey unilaterally 
decided to grant licenses for exploitation of the Aegean continental shelf in 1973 which 
included areas that Greece had already granted to foreign companies for exploration 
(Rozakis, no date). 
 
According to the Greek side, the islands are entitled to their own continental shelf 
based on the Geneva Convention. Thus, most of the continental shelf should be 
considered to be Greek and moreover Turkey shall not have any rights to the west of the 
Greek Islands because this is a threat to its sovereignty (Aydin, 2004). The issue of 
sovereignty is probably the main concern of the Greek state which in any case cannot 
accept Greek territory to be within Turkish continental shelf. To understand better this 
concern, one should also keep in mind that the Greeks fear that Turkey does not only 
have economic reasons to claim half of the Aegean’s continental shelf. The fact that 
throughout the years of exploration there are no major exploitable oil reserves found 
(Theodoropoulos, 1995; Aydin, 2004) backs up this fear. 
 
Turkey’s point of view on the continental shelf issue is completely different from 
the one Greece stands for. The first and most important argument of Turkey is that the 
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area she claims constitutes the natural prolongation5 of the Turkish territory and that, in a 
geomorphological sense, the continental shelf upon which the eastern Aegean Islands rest 
forms the prolongation of her mainland (Rozakis, 1997: 101). In that sense the Greek 
islands lying very close to the Turkish mainland do not possess a continental shelf of 
their own (Bolukbasi, 2004). As a solution to the problem, Turkey proposes the 
delimitation of the continental shelf on the basis of equitability. However, according to 
Turkey’s position in order for the equitability method to apply on the Aegean case, the 
bases should be the Greek mainland and the Turkish Anatolian coasts, rather than the 
islands. 
 
 
5.2.2 Territorial Sea 
 
 
According to the current situation in the Aegean Sea, Turkey and Greece apply 
the six-mile limit for their coasts, meaning both their mainland and islands. Since, the 
territorial sea implies sovereign rights it is very important to understand that the territorial 
sea is part of a state’s territory. Thus, under the current status quo Greece owns 43.5% of 
the Aegean Sea, Turkey owns approximately 7.5% and the international waters comprise 
49% (Evin, 2005). 
 
  
5.2.2.1 Positions of the Turkish and the Greek side 
 
 
The current status in the Aegean Sea concerning the territorial waters does not 
cause any problems and it is acceptable from each side vis-à-vis the other. The problem 
begins with Greece’s claims that she holds the right to extend its territorial waters to 12 
nautical miles when the time is convenient. The right of Greece to a 12 n.m. territorial sea 
is a direct outcome of the United Nations Convention of the Law of Sea (UNCLOS III) 
                                                 
5
 Highlighted in the original 
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which Greece signed in 1982, and was ratified by the Greek State in 1995. According to 
the ratification act: 
 
Greece has the inalienable right, in application of Article 3 of the 
convention which is being ratified, to extend at any time the 
breadth of its territorial sea up to a distance of 12 nautical miles 
(Ioannou, 1997).     
 
According to the Greek arguments, the fact that the Aegean Sea is a semi-closed 
sea does not deny the right to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles because 
although the status of the semi-closed seas is acknowledged in UNCLOS III, it is not 
implied anywhere in the convention that the 12 n.m regime is differentiated depending on 
the case. Finally, to answer Turkey’s claims that the possible extended Greek territorial 
waters will cover Turkish continental shelf, the Greek side brings the argument that the 
right for territorial sea, as a right of sovereignty, precedes the right to continental shelf 
(Rozakis, no date). 
 
The governments of Turkey have repeatedly declared that if Greece attempts 
unilaterally to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, it will constitute a casus 
belli for Turkey (Aydin, 2004). To understand Turkey’s hard position on the issue it is 
important to point out that in the case of extension its vital interests in the Aegean are 
being offended. Concretely, Turkey’s free access to high seas will almost disappear as the 
ships will have to go through Greek waters. Moreover, automatically Turkey will also 
loose rights to a big part of the Aegean continental shelf (scientific researches, 
exploitation rights, cable laying etc), rights provided by the use of waters (fishing and 
navigation), and rights in the airspace of the Aegean (military maneuvers, overflight etc) 
(Gunduz, 2001). To back up its case legally, Turkey refers to the equity and equitability 
principles provided by international law, the rule of the ‘persistent objector’ and the 
status quo set by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. In addition, Turkey points out that the 
character of the 12 nautical mile rule in UNCLOS III is opposite to the one Greece tries 
to implement, in the sense that this rule tried to favor the freedom of the seas by 
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preventing some states from extending their territorial waters to a limit greater than the 
12 nautical miles (Bolukbasi, 2004).        
 
In order to give a concrete image of what the Aegean Sea will look like in the 
case that Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, it is worth mentioning 
that Greece will extent its sovereign rights to 71.5% of the Aegean, Turkey would merely 
increase her share to 8.8% and the international waters will decrease to 19.7% (Evin, 
2005). The current status quo and the situation that will arise in the case of extension of 
the territorial waters to 12 nautical miles can be seen at the maps provided at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
 
5.2.3 Problems concerning the airspace above the Aegean 
 
 
There are two different problems between Greece and Turkey which concern the 
airspace over the Aegean Sea. The first one refers to the width of the Greek national 
airspace; it is a question of sovereignty and it is also connected to the territorial waters 
issue. Concretely, the question rises from the denial of Ankara (and most of the 
international community) to recognize a different width limit than the limit of the 
territorial waters for the Greek national airspace. The second issue concerns the status of 
the Flight Information Area (FIR), which is not a question of sovereignty, but only 
jurisdiction over a particular area which aims to ensure safety in flights.  
 
 
 
5.2.3.1 Positions of Greece and Turkey 
 
 
In June 1931 with a presidential decree Greece fixed its national airspace to ten 
nautical miles. Until the present day Greece retains this length for its national airspace 
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while its territorial waters limit is, as mentioned before, fixed at 6 nautical miles. There 
are three different arguments from the Greek side which justify this, moderately unusual, 
practice of the Greek state as explained by Rozakis (no date). The first one advocates that 
Greece has two maritime zones, one of six miles and a second one which extends 4 miles 
beyond the first one and it aims to serve only for the control of the air traffic. The second 
one suggests that the different width limits for territorial waters and national airspace is in 
accordance with the international law since the width of the national airspace width is 
within the maximum allowed by the international law width of the territorial zone, which 
is as mentioned before set to 12 nautical miles. The third one proposes that the status of 
unequal zones has existed for more than 40 years with no objections by a third party 
(including Turkey) and therefore it can be considered as a local custom (also in Ioannou, 
1997). However, it should be noted that there are voices that question the usefulness of 
the 10 mile air space and support the idea of a homogeneous width limit for the territorial 
sea and the national airspace (Theodoropoulos, 1995). 
 
Concerning the FIR, Greece recalls the right granted to it by the Third Regional 
Meeting of the European Civil Aviation Conference in 1952. According to the decisions 
taken there the limits of the Athens FIR were fixed at a point bordering the outer edge of 
the Turkish territorial waters, leaving Greece in control of both international and Greek 
national airspace over the Aegean (Syrigos, 1998). Greece, based on these rights, and in 
order to ensure safety in air traffic, asks from every military aircraft entering the Athens 
FIR to submit flight plans.  
 
Turkey does not recognize the 10 nautical miles airspace which Greece claims for 
itself and frequently Turkish military planes fly in the international airspace of the 
Aegean within the 10 mile limit (Aydin, 2004). Turkey claims that Greece’s arguments 
have no validity under international law, mainly because under international law the 
limits of national airspace should coincide in length with the limits of the territory, in this 
case the 6 miles. Moreover, domestic legislation, like the Greek presidential decree which 
established the 10 mile national airspace limit, is meant to implement international law 
and not create it. Finally, to answer the Greek claim that the unquestionable use of the 10 
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mile airspace for 43 years has created a local custom, Turks answer that simply they were 
not aware of it until 1974 (Bolukbasi, 2004). 
 
As far as the FIR is concerned, Turkey accuses Greece of using its authority given 
to it over the FIR in order to extend its sovereign rights to the whole Aegean airspace, 
meaning including the air over high seas. Bolukbasi (2004) gives examples of corridors, 
with extreme lower and higher flying limits, which were aligned by the Greek state and 
which were moving very close to the Turkish coast. As for the flights of military planes, 
which Greece considers as violations since they do not submit flight plans before their 
entrance to the Athens FIR, Turkey claims that the Chicago Convention only covers 
flights being carried out only by civil aircrafts (Evin, 2005). Therefore Turkey has no 
responsibility to inform the Greek services for the flights of their military planes over 
international air space. 
 
 
5.2.4 Militarization/Demilitarization of theEastern Aegean Islands 
 
 
To understand better the arguments of the two parties, and especially those 
coming from the Greek side, it is vital to divide the islands of the Eastern Aegean into 
three different groups. The first group includes the islands of Mitilini (Lesvos), Chios, 
Samos and Ikaria which fall under Article 13 of the Lausanne Treaty. The second group 
includes the islands of Samothrace and Lemnos which are situated north, close to the 
Dardanellia entrance and fall under article 4 of the above treaty. The third and final group 
is the Dodecanese islands which were granted to Greece by Italy in 1947 with the Paris 
Peace Treaty. 
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5.2.4.1 Positions of Greece and Turkey 
 
 
In the case of militarization of the islands of the Eastern Aegean, Greece does not 
deny her obligations that has undertaken under the Lausanne Treaty. However, she argues 
that there are special circumstances that led to the militarization of the islands. For the 
first group of islands Greece bases her arguments on Article 51 of the UN Charter which 
backs up the right of each nation to defense (Theodoropoulos, 1995). Actually, this 
argument can also stand for the other groups. Even though this Article states that the right 
of defense is granted to a nation only after an attack has already been made against it6, 
Greece argues that the common practice in international community has shown that states 
can go on with preventive actions concerning their defense. For the islands of Lemnos 
and Samothrace Greece argues that article 4 of Lausanne Treaty has been replaced by the 
Montreux  Convention in 1936, which gave full sovereignty to Turkey over Dardanelles 
and the Islands Imvros and Tenedos. After that Turkey militarized these islands and 
Greece did the same for Lemnos and Samothrace (Rozakis, no date). Concerning the 
Dodecanese islands, their demilitarization status is an outcome of the Paris Peace Treaty 
between Greece and Italy. The treaty directly states in Article 14 that the Dodecanese 
islands should be demilitarized7. Since Turkey is not a part of the specific treaty, she 
cannot, according to Greece claim a clause from the treaty. As long as Italy has never 
protested for the militarization of the Dodecanese islands, Turkey also has no right to do 
so (Rozakis, no date). 
 
 
5.3 Minorities 
 
 
The status of the minorities in Greece and Turkey is set again by the Lausanne’s 
Treaty. The obligations of the two sides (rights to education, religion, security and civil 
                                                 
6
 http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm 
7
 http://www.mfa.gr/greek/the_ministry/eny/1947_italy_treaty.doc 
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and political rights) are described in section three Articles 37-45 of the above Treaty. 
Moreover, Article 14 specifically refers to the status of autonomy that the islands of 
Imvros and Tenedos should have8.  
 
The issue of the minorities shall not be discussed here in detail, since there is no 
conflict concerning the interpretation of treaties or of international law. It actually has to 
do with complains from both sides concerning the rights of the minorities. From the 
Greek side the main complains concern the reduction of the Greek minority population 
and the weakness or the unwillingness of the Turkish state to answer its obligations 
deriving from the Treaty of Lausanne. Also for the Greek government the issue of those 
who were deported in 1964 is open (Theodoropoulos, 1995).  
 
The Turkish complains according to Rozakis (no date) focus on religious rights 
being trampled by the Greek governments, barriers to members of the minorities for 
investments, hindrances to freedom of speech and expression.  
 
 
5.4 Images 
 
 
Despite all the real problems existing between Greece and Turkey, it would still 
be difficult to understand the conflict if we did not also take under consideration the 
feelings that Turkish population has for the Greek and visa-versa. I believe that 
explaining the images the one party has created towards the other is very indicative of the 
dynamics of the conflict and also it will give a more comprehensive understanding of the 
dispute.  
 
One of the first accounts of the images each side has for the other is given by 
Millas who explains the way school textbooks in both countries picture the other. So, in 
the Greek textbooks the Turks are described as barbaric, the enemy, invaders and so on, 
                                                 
8
 http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/lausanne.html 
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while there is a very positive view for the Greeks and their achievements. The same 
image exists in the Turkish textbooks, but from the opposite perspective. In this case the 
Turks are those who were ideal and the Greeks are pictured as unfaithful, unreliable, 
macerators of the Turks and so on (Millas, 2004). Moreover, under the same study Millas 
comes to the conclusion that these images described above are maintained in the Greek 
and Turkish literature and the historiography as well.  
 
Furthermore, Carkoglu and Kirisci (2005) give some very interesting data which 
reveal Turks’ perceptions of Greeks. According to their findings, Turks see the Greeks 
very negatively, ranking them only one position above the last in the friendliness 
perceptions. In the question of which country would be Turkey’s best friend in the 
international arena only 1.1% of the interviewees answered Greece while 36.1% 
considered Greece to be the worst friend (both open ended questions). Another very 
interesting finding is that Turks consider Greece to be their number one threat, since they 
believe that in the case Turkey is attacked this would be by Greece (29%).  
 
The same survey was also made in Greece with the reverse questions9, exploring 
the Greeks’ perceptions of the Turks. The data reveal that Greeks perceive Turkey as the 
main enemy in the international arena with a percentage of 72%. On the other hand, only 
0,5% considers Turkey as the closer ally of Greece. Moreover, on a scale ranging from 
one to ten, with one representing totally hostile and ten being totally friendly, 59,7% of 
the people questioned answered for one.  
 
 
5.5 A new era in the Greek-Turkish relations? 
 
 
The Greek- Turkish relations have undoubtedly entered a period of détente and 
rapprochement after 1999. In 1999 there are two major facts that certainly helped a lot in 
order for a turn in the relations between the two states to realize. The first one was the 
                                                 
9
 The survey has not been published yet but the data was kindly provided by Dr. Dokos from ELIAMEP 
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earthquakes that happened in Istanbul and in Athens approximately a month following 
the first one. The humanitarian help provided by each party to the other created the view 
that the earthquakes created a positive atmosphere in the Greek-Turkish relations: 
 
If this popular view is an accurate depiction of reality, then we are 
faced with the phenomenon of public opinion swaying reluctant 
governments. This is not uncommon in the Greek-Turkish relations 
but with a major difference: it has swayed them in the very positive 
direction, towards conflict and animosity rather than reconciliation 
and peace (Heraclides, 2004: 74). 
 
However, most scholars would agree that the positive turn in the Greek-Turkish 
relations had started even earlier. Earlier that year in May 1999, the two Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs had met in New York to set a group of common targets which concerned 
lower politics cooperation (Evin, 2005). This type of contact between Ismail Cem and 
Yorgos Papandreou, two ministers who were open to dialogue and communication, is 
referred to as ‘earthquake diplomacy’ (Couloumbis, 1999). 
 
No matter what exactly the turning point was, the positive atmosphere that existed 
at the end of September 1999 led to the change of the Greek policy line during the 
Helsinki Summit in December 1999, where Greece gave the green light to the beginning 
of negotiations between EU and Turkey which would lead to accession. Nevertheless, 
this change in Greek policy should not only be attributed to this positive atmosphere 
described above. In fact the Greek policy makers took the chance to engage Turkey in a 
process (democratization, detention of the military’s role etc) which would at the end 
have a positive effect on the conflict. Moreover, Greece also got immediate concessions 
from Turkey. Firstly, the two countries would submit the issues of delimitation of the 
continental shelf and gray zones to the International Court of Justice, if all the other 
means would fail. Secondly, Turkey accepted that the resolution of the Cyprus problem 
was not a condition for Cyprus accession (Tsakonas and Dokos, 2004). 
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5.5.1 The Europeanization of the Greek-Turkish conflict         
 
 
After the Helsinki summit a new chapter in the Greek- Turkish relations has 
begun. Firstly, the conflict internationalized or to be more specific Europeanized. All the 
distinctive issues described above became a matter of importance not only for Greece and 
Turkey, but also for the European Community, and the actions of these two parties as 
well as their strategies should now be re-examined in order to fit the European context. 
Apart from being ‘allies’ (which the two countries were since 1952 when they entered the 
NATO), they would also have to be partners.  
 
In that context, as we have seen from 1999 to the present days, we are no longer 
in the era of the big crises (Imia/ Kardak, Ocalan, S-300) but in an era that could be 
described as the time of communication, understanding and dialogue.  
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
 
As a conclusion to this chapter a chronology of the main developments in the 
Greek- Turkish relation over the past ten years will be given. This will also help in 
positioning the GTF and the GTJC, and some of their acts in the conflict context. The 
main incidents that had an impact on the Greek- Turkish relations can be seen in the 
following table: 
Table 3: Main Developments in the Greek-Turkish Relations 
 
Main developments in the Greek- Turkish relations 
1996- 2006   
Date: Incident: 
January 1996  
Imia/ Kardak crisis. The two countries reach 
at the brick of war, but the situation de-
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escalates before it becomes an armed 
conflict  
1997 S300 Crisis 
1998  Kick- off of the GTF 
February 1999 
Ocalan crisis. The Kurdish leader Abdullah 
Ocalan is abducted by the Greek Embassy in 
Kenya and transported to Turkey. The GTF is 
held in Athens where only one Turkish 
member chooses to attend. Other track- II 
initiatives are postponed.  
May 1999 
The two foreign ministers, Cem and 
Papandreou meet in New York and agree on 
low politics cooperation  
August 1999  
Earthquake in Turkey. Greece sends search 
and rescue teams  
September 1999  
Earthquake in Athens. Turkey responds by 
sending search and rescue teams.   
December 1999  
Helsinki Summit. Greece changes a long 
lasting policy and gives the green line to 
Turkey for starting of accession negotiations 
with the EU  
2000  
Kick- off of the GTJC. Two conferences are 
held in this year  
2001  GTF generates the Aegean paper 
2002  
Secret exploratory talks between Greece and 
Turkey start 
November 2002 
Elections in Turkey. The AKP wins the 
elections and becomes the governing party 
December 2002 Copenhagen Summit   
April 2004 
Elections in Greece. The New Democracy 
party wins the elections and becomes the 
governing party 
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Map 1: Aegean sea with 10 n.m. Greek Territorial sea  
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Map 2: Aegean Sea with 6 n.m. Greek Territorial sea 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
THE CASE OF GTJC 
 
 
 With this chapter the data analysis part of this thesis begins. The first initiative to 
be reviewed is the GTJC; the results from the questionnaires will be introduced and 
quotations from the interviews will provide qualitative data to support them. Firstly, the 
cognitive and relational outcomes are being examined and then the transfer strategies the 
GTJC used will be presented. A table which includes the results of the questionnaires is 
added at the end of this chapter. 
 
 
6.1 Cognitive outcomes in GTJC 
 
  
6.1.1 Learning about the other 
 
 
 The kinds of knowledge concerning the other side that a person can gain in a 
track-II initiative can take many forms. In the close constructed questionnaire there are 
six different questions which try the whole spectrum of the cognitive outcomes which are 
in any way connected with the other side. The results suggest that the participants of the 
GTJC as a whole believe that interaction through the Conference helped them 
considerably to learn about the other side. Following, I will present findings from the 
questionnaires and from the interviews. 
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 One type of learning is concerned with perspectives of the other, meaning if the 
members of the Contact Group think that their participation helped them understand the 
point of view of the other side. The answers in the interviews and the questionnaires 
suggest that the interviewees agree that they have seen a great deal of change in their 
learning in that respect.  
 
 All the participants from both the Greek and the Turkish teams agreed that their 
participation has helped them understand the perspective of the other. Moreover, in all 
the cases there was almost no hesitation for them to answer positively to this question, in 
contrast with some other questions, where sometimes they needed clarifications or they 
wanted to think about their answer. The results, however, can be considered normal 
because this question is quite general and it can cover a lot of things from the spectrum of 
knowledge about the other side. 
 
 Data from the interviews also illustrate about how participants understands and 
how they express this type of knowledge that they have acquired. For example a 
participant explains: 
 
“First of all, it gave us the possibility to realize the way the 
journalists from the other side operate. Meaning, which were the 
perceptions they had shaped all these years and so on. We 
approached and I think the same stands for the other side, the 
mentality and the way the journalists function” 
 
Through these lines we can understand that the Conference helped the participants 
understand the line of thinking of the other side, but also the interviewee goes one step 
further, and based on what he has experienced, he also believes that the rest of the people 
involved in the Conference should have seen a change like that in themselves.  
 
 A second type of learning regards the political dynamics of the other side. 
Alternatively, this question could be framed as understanding the ways that political 
powers on the other side are distributed. The overall results for this answer are not as 
homogenous as in the first question. However, in this case as well the majority of the 
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group answered positively, meaning that they have learned more on this issue and two of 
them answered no, indicating no change.  
 
In the interviews there are no direct expressions that might reveal that a 
participant learned more about the other side’s political dynamics. Nevertheless, there are 
a few indirect statements that suggest it. For instance a Greek journalist from the Contact 
Group says: 
 
“There is a completely different mentality between the Greek and 
the Turkish journalists. In the Turkish side you have the ones who 
are Kemalists, who are feared that the lack of the secular state will 
lead to the collapse of the state, and they hate everything that is 
Islamic. There is nothing like this in Greece” 
 
The above statement can also be correlated with the next type of learning which is 
somewhat similar to the political dynamics question.  
 
The next type of learning regards if participants had any new knowledge about the 
political needs of the other party or not. This means that participants should say if the 
Conference helped understand more the desires of the other party in the policy making 
level. Thus, in that case the above statement implies that some of the Greek interviewees 
understood the political need of the Turkish side for safety, in terms of territorial 
integrity. 
 
 To support this assumption, another Greek member of the GTJC commenting on 
the new knowledge says: 
 
“In correlation of the way the Turkish state acts towards Greece it 
was that the Turks had the same perception like as, let’s say of 
victimhood…What exists to the Turks is fear. They fear that, better 
of feared because this has also changed, Greece is a small but 
extremely dangerous state concerning the being of the Turkish 
state” 
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In this case, as before, it seems a significant cognitive outcome for the Greeks has 
been the understanding of the importance that the Turkish side gives to safety and 
security. 
 
The resemblance between the second and third questions in the questionnaire can 
also be seen in the answers, as again most people from the group  answered that they 
indeed have learned more about the other’s political needs. Again two interviewees, one 
from each side said that they have not learned anything new on this specific topic.  
 
The people who comprise the contact group were also asked if they have any new 
knowledge concerning the diversity on the other side. In plain words, this could be 
explained as an observation that the other group is not homogeneous and does not have 
only one opinion but there is more than one point of view within it. The results from this 
question are quite encouraging. All the Turkish members of the Contact Group and all its 
Greek members answered that they have enriched their knowledge on this topic. Once 
again this outcome makes much sense, especially if we consider the large number of 
people who participate in the conference. It would be really difficult for all these people, 
even if they belong to the same group, to share the same ideas.  
 
Interview data is also rich with respect to the diversity issue. For instance, in the 
quote above it is obvious that a Greek participant separates the Turkish team into 
Kemalists and Islamists. Even though this is a typical example of new learning about the 
other’s diversity, it can also be considered as a new type of stereotyping or “sub-typing”. 
Moreover, there are also other direct statements from participants on this issue as well. A 
Turkish participant clearly states: 
 
“After some time we discovered that the Greeks had differences on 
their opinion and they were people with whom we could do 
business with”  
 
The next type of learning covered in the questionnaire deals with political and 
social constrains. In this case what we are looking for is if there is any cognitive outcome 
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for the members of the Contact Group concerning this issue. The answers to this question 
from the questionnaire are all positive so much from the Turkish members and for the 
Greeks as well, a fact that indicates that all the journalists who are affiliated with the 
GTJC greatly appreciate the knowledge they gained form the Conference on the political 
and social constrains.  
 
On the other hand, the interviews are not indicative on this issue, and none of 
them includes a direct statement. An example of an indirect statement is: 
 
“I think we have learned the views of each other more, and this 
gave us the opportunity to understand the other side better. 
Understand the fears, understand the prejudices of the Greek 
media and understand the prejudices of the Turkish media. They 
understood us more and we understood them more” 
 
This quote from an interview with a Turkish member of the GTJC talks about 
fears and prejudices which can fall under the category of social and political constrains, 
in the sense that fears and prejudices can be considered as an obstacle for political and 
social rapprochement.  
 
A final type of learning is concerned with whether or not the interviewees realized 
that the other side is more sophisticated than they might have initially thought. This 
question aims to explore to what degree the members of the Contact Group began to see 
the other part as more complex than before. This type of learning is different than the 
learning about the diversity. What is meant by sophistication is that the ideas of one side 
are more complex, include a well- organized argumentation and they are not just arbitrary 
claims.     
 
In this case the results are interesting because although there is an agreement on 
the Turkish side that indeed they understood that the Greek side is more complex than 
they thought before, in the Greek side two of the Contact Group members said that there 
was no new learning concerning the sophistication levels of the Turkish side. However, 
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they also added that this does not necessarily means that they believe the Turkish side is 
not sophisticated or monolithic. 
 
Concerning the issue of complexity of the other side out of six interviewees it was 
only mentioned directly only by one Turkish member. As he mentioned: 
 
“as a result I made three or four trips to Greece. And I met many 
Greek journalists as a result of the Conferences and I saw that the 
Greek press was not as monolithic as it appeared from the outside 
that there were different kinds of people, there was a variety of 
outlooks, and I am sure the same thing stands for the Greeks”. 
 
After having finished with the questions covered in the close questionnaire which 
deal with cognitive outcomes about the other, I have to mention that there are also many 
statements that came up in the interviews and suggest knowledge about the other side but 
do not fit under the categories mentioned. For instance statements like: 
 
“I think the most important thing I learned is that Turks and 
Greeks can live together and that Turks and Greeks are very 
similar in many respects”  
 
or  
 
“we understood that as long as we know each other better then we 
were closer to understand each other mental language”.  
 
The statements above are actually a direct reference to what is called 
“empowerment” and it is also one of the possible cognitive outcomes of track- II 
initiatives mentioned in d’Estree et. al. (2001). In this case it seems that the Conference 
helped the participants to create a positive and optimistic approach towards the future and 
empowers them. 
 
Another issue that worth commending on is that two out of six people in the 
interviews stated that the Conference did not change the way they have been thinking for 
the other side. Nevertheless, the same people seem to have given some positive answers 
in the questionnaire which has filled in after the interview.  
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6.1.2 Learning about ‘in- group’  
  
 
This type of learning is concerned with learning about one’s self or the in-group. 
The results suggest that members of the GTJC recognize that they have learned more 
about their own side, but nevertheless less than they learned about the other side. Another 
observation is that the Turks tend to be more positive about this type of cognitive 
outcomes while the Greeks tend to say ‘no’ more often, and they are more reluctant to 
accept that they have also learned about their self. It seems that the Greek interviewees 
had a strong belief that they were very well informed about their “in group” even from 
before the Conference.  
 
 The first question on this topic is if the participants have understood more the 
political needs of their side. The results show that half of the interviewees answered 
negatively, and one of the Greeks answered that even if there is a change, this is negative 
in the sense that he was confused more about the political needs of the Greek side. The 
second question is whether or not the members through the processes of the Conference 
have understood more the political and social constrains of their side. In this case even 
though the answers from the Turks are all positive, one Greek said no and two answered 
‘yes’ but one of them said that the change has been rather negative than positive. The 
third question is about the diversity on ‘our side’. Once again all of the Turks answered 
positively while the Greeks were again more skeptical, with the majority of them saying 
that they feel more confused about the diversity on the Greek side and only one of them 
answering for positive change. A comment that should be made here is that although the 
interviewees perceive confusion as negative, it actually shows that their thinking is 
challenged. 
 
 Unfortunately there are not many statements in the interviews which can offer 
qualitative examples of the changes that the members of the Contact Group have 
experienced on this issue. There are two reasons for that, first of all, people were more 
willing to talk about their new knowledge about the other side, and not their own. 
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Secondly, as the negative answers are many, the change of people mentioning a change in 
the interviews is also reduced. However, even in the quotes that have been given already 
we can find sentences that imply knowledge about the people’s own side.  
 
 
6.1.3 Learning about the conflict 
 
 
 This category of cognitive outcome concerns new knowledge about the conflict 
itself, in this case the Greek- Turkish conflict. There are two questions in the 
questionnaire that deal with learning about the conflict. 
  
 In the first question the interviewees had to answer if they have understood that a 
solution to the conflict is possible or not. At this point the participants must think about 
the things they heard during the Conferences, and also the things they learned about 
themselves and the other side and judge if all that have made them believe that resolution 
of the conflict is more probable than they thought.  
 
 In this question the answers are quite positive with the majority participants 
saying that they have changed their mind about the tractability of the conflict. Moreover, 
one member who answered negatively also added that he always thought that the 
problems between Greece and Turkey could be resolved so there was no further space for 
the Conference to convince him otherwise.   
 
 The references of new learning about the tractability of the conflict are not very 
frequent in the interview data but still some direct expressions can be found. For example 
a Turkish member of the contact group says: 
 
“I also felt that my theory about resolving conflicts between Turkey 
and Greece was collaborated by this experience. In one of the 
early meetings before the earthquakes and the rapprochement 
started, I had reached the point where I was beginning to think 
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that Greek Turkish problems was irresolvable, that they could only 
been transcended. One of the point I was trying to make is that I 
believe that one format of transcendence would occur if Greece 
and Turkey were both members of the European Union. Not one 
down here and the one up there. That would be a format because 
when Turkey and Greece become members of the same political 
institution which aims for greater integration many of the 
problems that we have would become meaningless; such as Cyprus 
and the use of the Aegean. And so on and so forth. So I think my 
theory was proven” 
 
Another member, also from the Turkish group, says that this experience was 
helpful for everyone who participated in order to understand how steps forward can be 
accomplished: 
 
“Yes, I learned about the conflict, because in any conflict, the basic 
thing is to compromise. You cannot solve any conflict if you do not 
compromise. So I think the basic idea started having a base, you 
know that we should compromise. We cannot get everything we 
cannot give everything we should compromise”    
 
The second type of learning concerned with the conflict itself asks the participants 
if the Conference has helped them understand or acquire concepts that are useful to better 
analyze the conflict. For example, as we have seen in the chapter where the Greek- 
Turkish conflict context is described there are many details especially regarding legal 
issues attached to the International Law.  
 
 The members of the Contact Group were very positive to this question and all of 
them answered positively with no restrictions or comments. Unfortunately, in the 
interviews no one mentioned anything that can be coded under this category. This may 
not be so strange though, if we take into consideration that the question is very specific, 
and in case this type of learning is not among the first things an interviewee would think 
of in an open ended interview. However, there are some things that the interviewees said 
and can be put under the new learning about the conflict. A Greek member suggests that 
there was an assumption reached in the Conference which concerned knowledge about 
the conflict and the role of the media: 
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“What came out was the assumption that there is a vicious circle of 
mutual feedback from the media to the public opinion and visa 
versa. When for example the media were sensing that the public 
was moving towards extreme positions they repeated it, and then 
the extreme positions influenced the public opinion” 
 
It is also interesting that two of the people in the interviews directly denied any new 
learning about the conflict. One of them, a Greek, states clearly: 
 
“The perception that existed about the conflict continues to exist, 
there is nothing changed” 
 
while the other, a Turk, also challenges the whole idea that the Conference dealt with the 
conflict itself: 
 
“We are not interested in conflicts. Each side has so many people 
to deal with the conflict. We are not even discussing an issue like 
Aegean issue or FIR line or…we have never discussed these kinds 
of things”. 
 
 
6.1.4 Learning about track-II 
 
  
Moving on to more concrete types of new learning there is a paradox starting to 
appear. There is an inconsistency between the answers given in the close- constructed 
questionnaire and the ones given in the interview. For example all the members of the 
GTJC said that they have learned more about track-II initiatives and the way these 
initiatives can contribute to conflict resolution. On the other hand there is no direct or 
indirect expression about this type of learning in the interviews. The lack of statements 
that mention new learning about the track- II processes in the open ended interviews can 
be interpreted again that this is not one of the most salient pieces of learning for 
participants even though they reported learning of it. 
 
 86 
6.1.5 Learning new skills 
 
 
 The same paradox as above can be also observed in this case. However, in this 
case also in the questionnaire it is only half of the participants who say that they have 
learned new skills, including two Turks and one Greek, while the other half says that 
there is no new learning that concerns skill building. These skills mainly concern policy 
analysis skills, negotiation skills, or communication skills etc. 
 
 The above data covered the cognitive outcomes from the Journalists’ Conference. 
The outcomes seem to have been positive especially in specific types of learning, such as 
learning for the other side. The analysis will continue with the relational outcomes of the 
GTJC. 
  
6.2 Relational outcomes of the GTJC 
 
 
 For the relational outcomes what is more important is the changes in relations that 
the participants of the GTJC and especially the members of the Contact Group have 
experienced since the time that the Conference has been organized. During the coding of 
the interviews there were three parameters kept in mind. The first one is whether or not 
there were friendships developed among the members of the Contact Group or between 
the six members of the GTJC and other journalists that participated in the Conference. 
The second one involves the building of trust, and how the process of trust building 
moved forward through the processes of the Conference. Finally, other relational 
outcomes, such as empathy, were also coded if they were mentioned in the interviews.  
 
 On the first question which concerns friendship, all of the interviewees answered 
positive, meaning that they indeed have made friends with some people from the other 
side. Moreover, some of them pointed out while completing the questionnaire that 
although they have come closer with many of the people, there are one or two people that 
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they really developed friendship with, and these people are not necessarily also members 
of the Contact Group. 
 
 Friendship seems to be an issue that is often mentioned in the interviews as well. 
There direct and indirect statements that show that people from the two sides have 
improved the relations among them considerably. A very characteristic statement comes 
from a Greek which says about the Conference: 
 
“It contributed much from the Turkish side; For the Greek side it 
contributed that some Greek journalists met with some Turkish 
journalists”  
 
and he continues later on 
 
 “the Conference had a very big impact in the sense that it created 
an atmosphere of rapprochement and smoothening and friendship 
between the two parties”.  
 
There are some indirect statements which are indicating the good relations that 
have been constructed as an outcome of the Conference. A Turkish member says: 
 
“I think there has been great improvement, there is constant contact, 
and personally I have constant contact with quite a lot of colleagues 
in Greek media”.  
 
Another Turks says: 
 
“I know now that if I go to Greece I have an address in my mind in 
my pocket, I know I am in an easy position there, so it really helps 
a lot”.  
 
In both these statement we can understand that friendship is a reality between 
members and participants of the GTJC, but also that this friendship is highly appreciated 
by the members of the Contact Group. 
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On the second question which deals with trust among the two sides, the answers 
have been quite positive as well. All of the Contact Group members accepted that there 
has been a change in terms of trust towards the other side, and as time goes by they feel 
like they can trust the other side more. In the interviews there are no direct statements 
which express trust. However, there are a couple of indirect expressions which imply that 
people have engaged in a trust building process. For instance, Turk says in the interviews: 
 
“in the 1st conference we had, I noticed that the Greeks were not 
accusing the Turks and the Turks were not accusing the Greeks, 
instead the two sides were very self- critical with a spirit of self 
criticism which is very helpful and that has been the case ever 
since. I think this is a direct result of the conference due to the 
good will it created between the two sides. Because when you get 
to know your colleague you know that he is not a spy or whatever, 
and therefore instead of accusing him of being all these things, you 
say ok maybe I should look at what I am doing” 
 
This indirect statement actually generalizes to all the journalist who participate 
and not only the members of the Contact Group, and constitutes an example of how better 
relations can lead to trust building, and also how trust helps the Conference processes to 
move forward more smoothly.  
 
Finally, concerning relational outcome of the GTJC there are no statements on 
behalf of the interviewees that suggest that there were other types of outcomes such as 
the ones mentioned at the beginning of the chapter.  
 
 
6.3 Transfer strategies 
 
 
 As it has been mentioned in the methodology chapter, this part of the research is 
completely exploratory. The goal of the data analysis is to find what kind of methods did 
the initiatives use, if used at all, in order to transfer the learning acquired from the track- 
II process to the macro- level. Following the directives given in the literature review, the 
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overall transfer has been divided in three parts including upward, downward and lateral 
transfer strategies. 
 
 The GTJC is a special case when we are looking at transfer strategies because of 
the nature of the initiative, which aims to create better relations and understanding among 
the journalists of the two sides. Influencing the participants is the primary if not the only 
target for the workshop. Therefore, there is no planned strategy for influencing people 
outside of the Conference. However, there are some interesting data on transfer about the 
GTJC that I still want to discuss. 
 
 
6.3.1 Upward transfer 
 
 
Upward strategies include different methods that the initiative might use in order 
to influence politicians and policy makers. Since the participants in the Conference are 
journalists they have connections with the politicians at varying degrees, and as I am 
going to explain further on the GTJC has maintained a close connection with politicians 
from both Greece and Turkey. However, what is difficult toassess , is the will of the 
contact group to influence the politicians. This is because the goal of the Contact Group 
was to influence the journalists who participated and through them the public opinion, 
and not the politicians. Thus, as it can be seen from the interviews most of the members 
of the Contact Group do not want their initiative to be associated with politicians, in the 
sense that they like to think the GTJC as an independent initiative which concerns only 
the journalists of the two countries. As a Greek interviewee says:  
 
“We did not seek to create a different policy; the policy is being 
planned by the governments of the two countries. We went beyond 
that to see how these results of the policies applied are being 
managed by the media”. 
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 Nevertheless, the organizers have invited politicians to all the Conferences that 
have taken place until now. In the first Conference in Athens the two Foreign Ministers, 
Mr. Yorgos Papandreou and Mr. Ismail Cem, attended the meetings welcomed the 
participants and gave a brief talk, pointing out the importance of such initiatives for the 
rapprochement. In the second Conference in Istanbul the Turkish Prime Minister at the 
time, Mr. Bulent Ecevit threw a cocktail party for the participants. Finally, in the third 
meeting which was also held in Athens, the spokesman of the Greek government and his 
Turkish counterpart attended some of the meetings. For the fourth Conference which is 
scheduled for June 2006, there is an effort from the Contact Group to bring both the 
Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece. 
 
 The presence of high ranking politicians in some of the Conference’s meetings, 
however, should not lead automatically to the assumption that there is upward transfer, 
since happens only when there is transfer of cognitive outcomes from the micro-process. 
Actually, a closer look shows that the participation of politicians has been quite typical, 
and their role was limited to giving opening speeches, throwing welcoming parties for the 
journalists and meeting with the journalists. So, as it seems the aim for inviting 
politicians is not to influence them, but on the contrary as some of the Contact Group 
members say the presence of politicians aims to give more momentum to the initiative. 
For example a Turkish member says: 
 
“The first conference was really successful, the two foreign 
ministers came Ismail Cem and Papandreou, I think they were the 
ones who took the initiative to have a new start in the Greek 
Turkish relations and they gave support to the Turkish Greek 
media conference as well, and after that it was a big success the 
first one”    
 
 Another Turkish interviewee said: 
 
“we have off course good contacts as journalists with the 
politicians which gives us the opportunity to push forward in this 
Conference and to take the initiative…to get their support as well. 
The ministers’ participation for example is important; it gives a 
momentum to our initiative. And the other side, they are influential 
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journalists also, and that helps. But nobody has a real political 
connection I would say”. 
 
 From the above statements it is quite clear that the Contact Group sees the 
presence of the politicians, not as a chance to for the Conference to influence the 
politicians through upward transfer, but on the contrary, as a chance for the Conference to 
gain more momentum and become more successful. So, the assumption that could be 
made for the case of the GTJC is that the direction of transfer is opposite that the one the 
upward transfer implies.  
 
 The connection with the policy makers exists also in another level. Some of the 
interviewees believe that the Conference has helped (or can help) the work of the 
politicians because it diminishes nationalism in the media and therefore it reduces the 
possible political cost in the case of rapprochement. One interviewee says: 
 
“I think we can make it easier for the politicians. If we minimize 
the nationalistic language they will have a better ground to discuss 
the matters to have the possibility to compromise, to have to give 
and take on the table because everybody is under the political 
pressure, and psychological and social pressure so the more we 
minimize the nationalistic way of approaching I think the political 
atmosphere will ease more and more every day” 
 
 However, also this interaction cannot be considered as transfer. What can be 
argued is that there is a complementarity or coordination between the Conference and the 
official track, in the sense that these seems to be a two-way assistance between the two.  
  
 To sum up, it seems that there is no intended or planned upward transfer from the 
Conference to the policy- making and the decision- making levels. The connection with 
the politicians seems to be typical, and the politicians are used by the organizers in order 
to help increase the momentum of the initiative. Since, there is even a limited interaction 
upward transfer cannot be excluded. Actually it is likely that while the politicians are 
present in the Conference they have the chance to talk to the participants and exchange 
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views about the initiative. However, even if this type of upward transfer happens, it is not 
planned by the organizing group and also it is very limited. 
 
 
6.3.2 Downward transfer  
 
  
The second group of transfer strategies includes those methods that may have 
been used by the initiative in order to influence the society, or more simply the big mass 
of people. Before I discuss the qualitative data from the interviews there are two 
important points I would like to mention. Firstly, as already mentioned above the GTJC 
did not intent to influence anybody but the participants only. However, and this brings me 
to my second point, since this initiative concerns journalists and media, we can assume 
that what the designers of the Conference had in mind from the beginning was to have an 
impact on the public opinion via the journalists by diminishing the nationalistic language 
in the media of the two countries. So, even if the primary goal is to influence the 
journalists who have participated, through them we can also assume that there is the 
underlying goal of influencing the public opinion. Based on this assumption it can be 
argued that the macro-level that the downward transfer aims can be divided in two. First 
comes the journalists who participate in the Conference’s processes and their number is 
quite big and secondly is the influence on the public opinion.  
 
 The above assumption is clear among the members of the Contact Group who 
seem to believe that the changes that the journalists went through, will influence 
decisively the way news are broadcasted on the media and had an impact on the public 
opinion as well. this perception of the Contact Group is well emphasized in one of the 
interviews; A Greek member says: 
 
“Laicism and nationalism had invaded the media etc. 
characteristics which we understood they had affected both the 
newspapers and radio or television of Greece and Turkey. So, 
since we accept the media have an essential role in the shaping of 
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public opinion, the question was how the media with more 
responsibility, moderation and understanding would intervene in 
this process of shaping the public opinion” 
 
Another statement, from a Turkish member this time also shows how the GTJC 
managed, according to him, to create positive atmosphere among the journalists and 
through them to the news coverage: 
 
“it has worked much better than we had expected from the 
beginning, the whole tone of media coverage in both countries 
changed partly as a result of what we were doing, I am not going 
to take credit for the whole change, obviously that change was 
taking place at many levels and journalists of course are not 
isolated from the rest of society and they are affected by other 
changes in society. But the media component was especially 
important because as I said before media is an amplifier of 
feelings, feelings of sympathy and feelings of hatred, and the 
coverage on both sides is toned down considerable, the old 
acrimonious nationalistic rhetoric is no longer visible” 
 
So, the members of the Contact Group believe quite strongly that, although 
indirectly the initiative addressed the public opinion’s change. 
 
 Nevertheless, there is an obvious lack of planned downward transfer strategies 
that could further contribute to a more direct downward transfer. The Contact Group has 
not discussed how the Conference can influence the public opinion or the media attitude 
at large. For example there is no official website of the initiative or joint press 
conferences that could make the work of the Conference known to a broader group of 
people. What do exist are some individual efforts from some of the members. For 
instance Nur Batur said she has given some speeches in Middle East Technical 
University (METU) in Ankara and also in Sakarya University about the Conference. 
Haluk Sahin also told me that sometimes in his lectures he mentions examples from the 
GTJC and some of the results of the meetings. Last but not least, all of the six members 
of the Group said that in interactions they have with friends and colleagues they share 
some of the new learning they have acquired in the Conference.  
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6.3.3 Lateral transfer 
 
 
 All of the six people interviewed admitted that there has been no interaction with 
regional or international organizations with the aim of sharing knowledge or make 
recommendations. This fact is further proved by the lack of statements in the interviews 
that might suggest this type of interaction. However, there is a project going on that if 
realized could be described as lateral transfer. As an interviewee reveals: 
 
“So now on the fourth conference our aim is, if we can possibly 
make it, to create an association between two sides and combined 
by the journalists of two sides. Then it will be an institutionalized 
relationship. Then we will withdraw, the next generation of the 
profession will take over hopefully” 
  
Hence, there is this goal of creating a bi- national Journalist’s Association which 
could work as a regulatory instrument. 
 
Finally, there was one occasion when a women’s NGO was invited to the 
Conference in order to offer their own views about the Conflict and the problems the two 
societies face. However, a member of the Contact Group confessed that this has not been 
a very useful contribution to the works of the GTJC because the people from the NGO 
started talking about their own issues with the result of confusing further more than help 
the works of the conference.   
 
 
6.3.4 Evaluation of transfer 
  
 
As it has been made clear by the research question the current work is not an 
evaluation research, and in any way it is not aiming to evaluate the transfer effects or 
impact either in the policy making level or the societal level. However, it is still 
important to describe the perception of the organizers on what the effect of their efforts 
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might have been. In general there is an optimistic view among the Contact Group that the 
initiative had a direct and indirect impact on the conflict. This is obvious in some 
statements that have already been quoted above. However, the general tendency in such 
initiatives is that the organizers themselves usually overemphasize and generalize their 
achievements. The overall impact cannot be measured with the current methodology and 
it is difficult to isolate the work of the Conference from the rest of the events in the 
Greek- Turkish relations.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
THE CASE OF THE GTF 
 
 
 Having examined the case of the GTJC in the previous chapter, this chapter deals 
with the GTF initiative and explores the cognitive and relational outcomes of the Forum, 
as well as the transfer strategies that it used. A table at the end of the chapter summarizes 
the results from the questionnaires.  
 
 
7.1 Cognitive outcomes of the GTF 
 
 
In this case the division of each learning group is the same as the one used in the 
case of the GTJC as the questionnaire remains the same. Thus, the questions focus on the 
learning for the other side, learning for the “in-group”, learning about the conflict, 
learning about track- II initiatives and learning new skills. 
 
 
7.1.1 Learning about the other 
 
 
In the case of the learning which concerns the other, there again six different 
indicators which are taken from questionnaire number one. Following I will analyze the 
answers that the participants of the GTF gave to these questions, concerning learning 
from the initiatives.  
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 As far as the learning and understanding of the other side’s perspectives is 
concerned, the responses have been very positive, just as in the case of the GTJC.  All of 
the participants of the Forum said that the GTF helped them understand the others’ 
perspective. Once again this was probably one of the easiest questions for the 
interviewees to answer, since there was no hesitation and no clarifying questions while 
answering.  
 
 The appreciation of the participants of the GTF to the understanding of the 
perspective of the other side is also clear in the interviews. One of the newer members of 
the initiative says:  
 
“I am not sure this process concerns itself with understanding the 
Greek and Turkish people. The process concerns with 
understanding Greek and Turkish ways of thinking perhaps in a 
more refine basis, politicians and high level academics. Yes. Let 
me put it like this…it did not change my views but it certainly 
provided a dramatic enrichment. I feel that I have been missing 
things for many years that I was not in the GTF. Changing perhaps 
no, but certainly enrichment to a point that it is really dramatic. 
This is I think and I can speak as a younger member of the Forum; 
I think that this has much to do with the exceptionally high quality 
of representation from both sides” 
 
There is also another quote from the interviews which I distinguished because it 
comes from a former Ambassador. As he mentioned:  
 
“I must say I learned a lot. I learned a lot about Greek view and 
perception of the problems. Although I had many discussions with 
Greek diplomats in the past, it was never on such a sustained 
basis” 
 
 The above statement is important because it actually shows how the GTF works 
and in general how a track- II environment can be more beneficial in terms of learning 
than official track.  
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The next learning is concerned with the political dynamics of the other side and 
how people who participated in the GTF managed to understand them better. This 
question carries special weight because the GTF is a political initiative, and therefore 
learning about the political dynamics of the other side is a very important part of the 
knowledge that the participants look for.  
 
 As in the previous question the participants seem to perceive that the GTF has 
helped them learn how the political dynamics are set on the other side. So, in this 
question as well, all the participants, Turks and Greeks, answered that there was a 
positive impact. The high ratio of positive answers should be expected. After all most of 
the talks taking place within the context of the GTF concern political issues, and there is 
a lot of space for the participants to express their political beliefs.  
 
 However, the impact of GTF in helping the participants understand the other 
party’s political dynamics is not reflected in the interviews as there are not many 
statements, direct or indirect, supporting this claim. It seems that the participants prefer to 
make more general comments about the understanding of the other without specifically 
mentioning the understanding of the political dynamics. However, there are still some 
statements that can support the results from the questionnaire. For instance a member of 
the Greek group, who is also a close advisor to a high ranked politician, says: 
 
 “one of the most important things was that we started to 
understand the complexity of each society, the different schools of 
thought, the different way of thinking of different categories of 
elites and this was particularly useful” 
 
In this case “different schools of thought” and “different categories of elites” can 
be translated into political dynamics, in the sense that different elites can be attributed to 
different political parties or distinguished political approaches. Another quite direct 
statement made from a Turkish participant says: 
 
 “For someone that worked in Turkish diplomacy for 40 years has 
to come across with the Greek position many times. So, I know 
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what the Greek position is. So I tried to figure out what its details 
were; what is the percentage of others behind a certain position” 
 
The next type of learning is also important for the GTF because it is, once again, 
dealing with the political level, meaning with knowledge that concerns details about the 
others political situation. Concretely, this question asks the participants how they 
evaluate the knowledge that they have gained from the GTF about the political needs of 
the other side. 
 
 In this question the majority of the interviewees answered positively and only one 
member of the Greek team answered negatively. What might be important to mention in 
this case is that the participant who did not answer positively is one of the younger 
members of the Forum, in terms of participation in the meetings, having been a member 
since 2003.  
 
 A very concrete example I would like to give is from a Greek participant. In his 
interview while talking about Turkey’s accession to the European Union he says:  
 
“I also learned that the Turks are very slow in understanding what 
this whole accession process actually means and what impact it 
has on their foreign policy especially vis-à-vis Greece. I think they 
are very slow in understanding that this means fundamental 
changes that have to come about and this is something that has 
emerged in every one of these meetings” 
 
The above statement, although it is in an indirect way, constitutes a fine example 
of understanding about the other side’s political needs, since the political need of Turkey 
may shape its foreign policy vis-à-vis Greece.  
 
The next type of learning is concerned if participation in the Forum has helped 
participants to learn or understand the diversities of the other side. The question was very 
interesting to the interviewees and many of them made comments about how within the 
context of the GTF there are no strict lines between the two groups, but also within the 
teams. Some of them while filling in the questionnaire said that some times there was 
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even “tri-versity” within the same group, while a couple noted that, although there was 
diversity in both groups probably the Greek team had more diversity than the Turkish 
group.  
 
Therefore, the results from the questionnaire do not come as a surprise. All the 
participants showed no reluctance to accept that through the GTF they managed to learn 
more about the diversity on the other side. The participants also mentioned learning about 
the diversity in the interviews. For example consider the following from a senior member 
of the Turkish group: 
 
“The interesting thing about the GTF is that sometimes you get 
what we call in Political Sciences “cross cutting cleavages”, that 
is sometimes you find your self not as talking as Greeks or Turks 
but you see some Greeks and Turks together and some Greeks and 
Turks on the other side. So you get this complicated matrix” 
 
The above statement is very important not only because it gives valuable 
information on how the discussion are held but also because it says that the diversity 
sometimes becomes so obvious that people agree more with a participant from the other 
group and disagree on the same issue with someone from their own group.  
 
The next type of learning is about if participants have learned new things about 
the other side’s political and social constrains or not. The answers from the 
questionnaires suggest that there was important learning in this area, with most of the 
participants answering positively to the question. Nevertheless, there were no statements 
in the interviews suggesting that this type of learning was a part of the learning and 
understanding that took place through the GTF process. What should be pointed out 
though, is that a couple of interviewees clarified that even though they answered in a 
positive way, they meant that it was more like an exposure to others constrains that rather 
really learning more about it. As a Greek participant said while filling in the 
questionnaire:  
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“we were familiar with the Turkish political and social constrains, 
but it was the first time we were exposed to it”.   
 
The final type of learning which concerns the other side is about the complexity 
of one side, and to what degree the participants think that they have understood that the 
other side is more sophisticated than they thought before their participation in the GTF. 
The ratio of positive answers to this question is not as high as in the rest of the answers, 
but still it quite high. The majority of the members answered yes, while some of the 
participants said that they do not think they learned anything knew in their regard. Some 
of them also added some comments like for example that they never thought the other 
party was not sophisticated and so on.  
 
One of the members made a quite interesting remark which is also a direct 
statement on this issue. She said:  
 
“of course also we found out that finally each side, and this was 
discovered from both sides, is not so lets say as monolithic as we 
tend to believe before” 
 
 Although this participant expresses only her opinion, she seems to think that this change 
has also happened to other participants as well from both the Turkish and the Greek 
teams.  
 
 Finally, a general comment regarding new knowledge about the other side is that 
all of the participants seem to agree that they have learned a lot. However, during the 
interviews some of the interviewees made general comments and avoided being very 
specific. So, for instance there are a lot of statements like  
 
“The meetings are about understanding one another. From that 
point of view the GTF has been successful and has been a notable 
beneficial influence in both countries”  
Or 
 “Well, the orientation of the forum is first of all to understand 
each others thinking”  
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made almost by every participant of the Forum. Another interesting issue is that although 
some people started with statements such as “It didn’t necessarily change my views about 
Greeks because I knew more about Greeks than just that group”, later on when they were 
elaborating on the issue they admitted having learned new things about the other side.  
 
 
7.1.2 Learning about ‘in-group’ 
 
 
 Following the pattern set in the discussion about cognitive outcomes for the GTJC 
case, learning about our side will be the next issue to touch upon. The results from the 
questionnaires suggest that this type of learning is not as frequent as learning about the 
other side. In all of the interviews there are only a couple of direct statements which show 
that people think they have acquired new knowledge about their in-group party as well. 
Some of the indirect statements have already been quoted above.   
 
 Concretely, in the question which asks about the political needs of the in-group, 
eight out of ten people answered positively. However, it should also be mentioned that 
both of the people who answered ‘no’ were Greek participants of the GTF. In that sense, 
the results can be compared with those of the GTJC where again the Greeks were more 
reluctant to answer this question positively. Nevertheless, it is difficult to explain the 
reasons for this variation between the Greeks and the Turks. The second question which 
deals with the understanding of the political and social constrains of one’s side has very 
similar results as the previous question. There are seven participants (4 Greeks and 3 
Turks) who answered positively and three who said no. On the third question about 
diversity in the in-group, all the Greeks answered that they have learned more, which up 
to a degree proves the point mentioned above that the Greeks were more diversified, 
while one of the Turkish participants answered negatively.  
 
 From the interviews there were only two direct statements which mention in 
general how learning for the in-group was one of the cognitive outcomes. The first one 
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comes from a Greek participant who is a member of the group from the beginning of the 
initiative. She says:  
 
“I would also say that we learn the details of the position of our 
own side, because in such a process we don’t learn only about the 
other side, you learn also about your own side and you can see 
your side with the eyes of the other. This is particularly useful”  
 
The above statement is quite interesting because once again the answer seems to engage 
all the members of the GTF; the interviewee prefers to use the form of ‘we’ instead of ‘I’ 
as she tries to explain that according to her beliefs this learning applies to the rest of the 
participants as well. The other statement comes again from a Greek member. During his 
interview he said:  
 
“I have learned a lot of things about the evolution and the ways of 
expression of Greeks as well. On such high level discussion people 
present, I think, their best self. And it is very interesting to see this 
happening not only from the Turkish side but also from the Greek 
side which I know better” 
 
Once again this is a direct statement about new learning about the in-group.  
 
 
7.1.3 Learning about the conflict 
 
 
 As we have already seen in the case of the GTJC the cognitive outcomes which 
concern the conflict itself can be divided by two types. The first one is learning about the 
tractability of the conflict and the second concerns learning about new concepts which 
can be used to understand the context of the conflict better. 
 
 On the first type of learning participants of the GTF showed a quite positive 
attitude, with most of them answering that their participation helped them understand that 
a solution to the Greek- Turkish conflict is more feasible than they thought before. Only 
in one case an interviewee answered negatively to this question.  
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From the interviews we can extract a lot of qualitative data which support the 
results of the questionnaire, since at least half of the people stated something that can 
directly or remotely be connected with this issue. A very representative example is what a 
Greek member of the GTF says about his participation in the Forum: 
 
“It made me believe that we can find solutions to all our main 
problems because the way we are brought up and what we hear 
mostly from the media makes us believe that these problems will 
never be solved without very painful concessions from one or the 
other side. Or a solution would never be accepted from the Greek 
or the Turkish society but through these discussions and through 
these different ideas that are being discussed I believe now that if 
there is enough political will from both sides then we can really 
find solutions on our main problems” 
 
Within the same spirit a Turkish participant, although he seems quite reluctant and 
uncertain he mentions: 
 
“If it changed it changed in a positive direction. Let’s say that I 
became more convinced that these are not unresolved differences” 
 
As it can be seen by both these direct statements not only there is a belief among the 
participants that they have learned that the conflict can be solved but this change has been 
positive in the sense that they started to believe that the conflict is indeed solvable. So, 
there is a more optimistic approach concerning the tractability of the conflict compared to 
before. 
 
As far as the second question about new concepts is concerned the interviewees 
have not been as positive as in the first question but still the majority of them answered 
positively. Even though there are some statements in the interviews I would like to share 
what I have experienced in the meeting which was held in Istanbul in March 2006, which 
is closely connected with this question.  
 
 In this meeting the members of the GTF had decided to call prominent people 
from Cyprus in order to discuss the Cyprus problem. Among the people who were invited 
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were individuals who under their affiliation they had excellent knowledge on important 
issues, but most importantly they were able to explain all the details. During the 
discussions the members of the peer group had afterwards they were mentioning how 
helpful had this meeting been for them and how the visitors from Cyprus had managed to 
inform them on very specific yet very important issues. This was a moment where new 
learning about concepts that concern the conflict had been very obvious in the group. 
 
 
7.1.4 Learning about Track- II 
 
 
  Learning about track- II, meaning new learning about the tractability of the 
conflict or new concepts that can help understand the conflict, has also been a cognitive 
outcome for the participants according to their answers in the questionnaires. Only one of 
the GTF members, a Turkish, answered negatively in this question. However, what 
should be pointed out is that three more people directly mentioned while filling in the 
questionnaire that although they learned more about the ability of track- II to contribute 
to conflict resolution, this also includes the limitations of track- II initiatives. In plain 
words, participants learned more for both the abilities and limitations of second track 
diplomacy.  
 
 Within the interviews there are some interesting statements on the issue, which 
show what people believe about track- II initiatives and specifically for the GTF. A 
Greek interviewee says: 
 
“If we want to see resolution to any conflict situation it is 
important to give time to an initiative and it is important to create 
roots with the same people who can meet for a long period of time. 
And I am insisting on that because it doesn’t happen usually. And 
also I think that we should not neglect these 1 ½ kind of initiatives 
because they can really make the difference some times” 
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In this case the person who makes the statement is being very straight forward 
about her belief that track- II initiatives can help the resolution of conflicts. Another 
member from the Turkish team explained how the unofficial format of the group has 
helped the Forum’s work: 
 
“What makes the GTF interesting is that it is very informal. It is 
really difficult to understand who leads, what happens, what are 
the lines of responsibility, draw an organizational chart for 
example. I think it is the strength, the informality is the strength of 
the organization”.  
 
 
7.1.5 Learning new skills 
 
 
 The answers from the questionnaire suggest that learning about new skills has 
been relatively low, at least for the Greek team, where only half of the participants 
answered positively. On the other hand, on the Turkish side all of the participants 
answered positively. The participants did not provide any other information on the type 
of skills that they have learned but in the questionnaires the examples of policy analysis 
skills and technical skills is given. 
 
 However, as in the case of the GTJC, as the questions are moving to more 
concrete types of cognitive outcomes, it is difficult to find direct or indirect statements in 
the interviews which can back up the data from the questionnaire. Thus, also in the case 
of the GTF there are no statements from the interviews that may suggest that some of the 
participants have learned new skills.  
 
7.2 Relational outcomes of the GTF 
 
 
 As it was described in the section on the Journalists’ Conference the relational 
outcomes have to do mainly with the development of friendships among the members of 
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the Forum and the development of trust. These are the two parameters that the 
interviewees were asked for in the questionnaire. However, while coding the interviews 
other relational outcomes were also taken into consideration. 
 
 According to the responses from the questionnaires there are significant relational 
outcomes in the GTF process. In the question that asks about trust building all the 
participants answered positively. However, what should be underlined here is that many 
of the participants were quite hesitant to answer to this question and they wanted to take 
some time before they filled in the questionnaire. What the participants were explaining 
later on is that although a certain amount of trust has been developed among the people in 
the two groups, there is still work to be done in this area. Also for some of them the issue 
of trust is very important and they wanted to be sure about their answer. Another 
interviewee said that trust keeps increasing as the time and meetings pass by.  
 
 This skepticism towards trust building it also obvious in the interviews where 
there is only one member of the GTF who makes a direct statement about the trust 
building process and the way trust has helped the group be more efficient. As she says: 
 
“I think that what worked was to create trust, climate of confidence 
to give space to the other to express their arguments and to listen 
seriously to them” 
 
So, in this statement the person who answers actually believes that trust is among the 
strength of the Forum, and this fact had positively influenced the process.  
 
 The results about development of friendships are not much different. Once again 
all the participants said that they have made new friends with people from the other side, 
and this time they were also more willing to answer positively. From the interviews some 
very indicative statements can be found. For instance a Turkish member of the Forum 
says:  
 
“I think that the Greek team in GTF is an excellent team. We 
worked very well together. It is rare you can find such a group 
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which has meetings where there is real discussion but where the 
atmosphere is always friendly, and where the sense of humor 
prevails” 
 
In this case it can also be seen how the element of friendship is also appreciated by the 
people who participate. Another participant says: 
 
“I see the GTF as a place where friendly atmosphere prevails and 
participants say anything without restriction of binding other 
people; they bind only themselves. And this gives us background 
information of how Greek friends look at Turkey from Athens, from 
their side and our Greek friends learn how Turks look at the things 
that happen in Greece” 
 
The above statement is another indicative example of how the unofficial status of the 
initiative has helped the development of a friendly atmosphere among the participants of 
the Forum.  
 
 In addition, I would like to add an incident which happened during my 
observation of the GTF. In the Istanbul meeting in 2006, after a certain point the visitors 
who had been invited from Cyprus were asked to leave the room so the core members of 
the Forum could have a discussion on their own. Up to that point the discussion had been 
quite formal. However, after the room was emptied by the visitors the atmosphere 
changed immediately and in a very obvious way to the observer. The discussion 
continued in a more unofficial format and the members took the chance to exchange 
friendly comments and criticize in a friendly environment what they had heard from the 
Cypriots in the previous sessions.  
 
 Finally, as in the case of the GTJC there are no expressions that state or imply that 
other relational changes have taken place; at least not as an immediate outcome of the 
Forum’s processes.  
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7.3 Transfer strategies 
 
 
 The GTF is, as mentioned above, a political initiative. As such its main purpose is 
to function as an advisory to the politicians and the policy makers in both Turkey and 
Greece. Thus, as the following analysis will suggest most of the efforts on behalf of the 
participants is targeted towards upward transfer as it was defined in the literature review 
chapter. However, there are also efforts of the initiative to influence people at the society 
level. In the following lines the main transfer strategies for all the transfer attempts that 
have been made by the Forum will be discussed.  
 
 
7.3.1 Upward Transfer 
 
 
 Most of the participants of the GTF have strong connections to high ranked 
politicians. Some of them are former Ambassadors, MP’s, or are currently serving as 
advisors to politicians. Thus, it does not really come as a surprise that all the GTF 
members in their interviews referred intensively to ways they try to influence 
policymakers and decision-makers and their overall connection with the politicians and 
the policy makers.  
 
 As an initiative the Forum was invited in many occasions by high ranked 
politicians and other officials to the meetings, so that they can share some of the 
knowledge the group has generated all these years. These politicians that the Forum tries 
to approach are mainly the current Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, but also 
other people who may play significant role in the political life of the two countries. For 
example one of the members says: 
 
“the foreign ministers used to accept us in both capitals for 
meetings, in Ankara very often with very high level people. We met 
Mr. Erdogan before he became Prime Minister, Mr. Gul and other 
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ministers. In Athens too, but in Athens the government is very busy 
because EU takes a lot of time from the members of the 
government. But two times per year Papandreou was meeting with 
us or Mr Yannitsis at that time” 
 
From the above statement it is made clear that high ranked politicians have been 
contacted by the GTF. In the meeting held in Athens in June 2006 also, Mrs. Dora 
Bakoyannis, the newly appointed Foreign Minister has been invited and it is highly likely 
that she will attend the meeting. Moreover, politicians from Cyprus are also invited to 
some of the meetings. For example in Istanbul 2006 meeting, Andros Kyprianou one of 
the higher members of the AKEL party participated, as well as, Oya Talat. Mehmet Ali 
Talat himself was in the meeting of the GTF which was held in Rome. In the same 
meeting the new UN envoy for Cyprus, Michael Muller, attended one of the sessions and 
met with the participants. So, to sum up the invitation and participation of high ranked 
politicians has been used as a method of transfer frequently by the GTF.  
 
 Another transfer strategy that has been used by the Forum is delivering ideas and 
recommendations to the policymakers. Actually, as an advisory initiative this is the 
strategy which is used in the most formal way by the Forum as a whole. I have already 
mentioned the policy paper that was the outcome of the participants work which came out 
in 2001. This paper was forwarded to the policy making level with the will (or hope), that 
it can offer a solid base for the beginning of the negotiations on the Aegean issues. Many 
of the participants mention about this paper and how it was leaked to the governments. 
For instance: 
 
“at the end of certain meetings we produced a paper and this 
paper was forwarded by the coordinators of both sides to their 
respective authorities. Mr. Turkmen forwarded it to the Turkish 
minister of foreign affairs and Mr. Karras to Mr. Molyviatis. He 
used to from now on he will forward it to Mrs. Bakoyannis”. 
 
So, this paper was sent to the two Foreign Ministers accompanied by a small letter 
from the participants. And this was not the only time something like that has happened. 
In one of the interviews a participant admits that this is a rather common practice: 
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“You know some times we make joint statements and these 
statements are sent to the governments. The recent on e for 
example we decided to send a joint statement to the governments 
asking what happened to the Aegean why is not there any progress. 
Both sides have contacted the Foreign Offices” 
 
Also many people while filling in the questionnaires said that this is a practice 
that has been used often.  
 
 Another strategy for upward transfer from a track-II initiative is the representation 
of one of the group members in the official negotiations. In the case of the GTF this 
happened as well. One of the members of the Forum, Argiris Fatouros, who had 
participated in the first years and he was part of the group when the ‘Aegean paper’ was 
edited, was later asked to be on the Greek team that participated in the official 
“exploratory talks” between the two governments. Professor Fatouros had to leave the 
group because of his new post and also the “exploratory talks” were being held in 
secrecy, so there was no available feedback about the ideas generated within the Forum 
have been used or not. However, some of the participants hope they are. As a Turkish 
participant says: 
 
“Argiris Fatouros was a member of the team and he is now in the 
official negotiations. But they are very professional. He does not 
give us any information of what is going on in the exploratory 
talks. But I assume that since he signed that document he probably 
used those arguments. That he knows the Turkish problems better” 
 
Almost the same idea is stated by a Greek participant: 
 
“at that time among the members of the Greek group was the 
Professor Argiris Fatouros, who was later named from the Greek 
government as one of the two official representatives who 
participate in the exploratory talks with the Turks on the same 
issues. From their part absolute secrecy was kept, but some times 
while having light talks we were asking him if they had taken this 
paper under consideration and I believe without him saying it that 
this paper is in their files and they use it as a possible pattern of a 
process that could lead to resolution” 
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So, in both these statements there is the belief that the paper the group has edited 
might influence the official negotiations between the two countries.  
 
 As a final strategy for upward transfer the contacting and delivering ideas should 
be discussed. This case concerns interaction outside of the GTF framework and therefore 
it is a different transfer strategy than the invitation of politicians to the meetings 
discussed before. Actually, from the interviews it can be assumed that this is the strategy 
that most of the participants pay most attention to. Currently, there are three participants 
who are directly affiliated with the policy making level; Two Greeks, each belonging to 
the two major political parties in Greece and one Turkish MP in the governing party in 
Turkey. In the interviews they give a very concrete image of their connection to the 
policy making level. One of the Greeks said: 
 
“I got involved when I was a special advisor to Yannis Valinakis, 
he is currently Greece’s deputy foreign minister, we were 
approached with the change of government to finance this project 
and it was within that framework that I was asked by Yannis 
Valinakis to participate in the Forum, in order more than anything 
to present the current political leaderships the use, and to be his 
person that would report whatever useful information comes out of 
it” 
 
The second Greek who is strongly affiliated with the opposition party says: 
 
“I myself was working with George Papandreou, ex-foreign 
minister and now the leader of the socialists’ party, who I have 
direct contact with” 
 
Finally, the Turkish participant explain his connection with AKP: 
 
“Actually, being served in the ministry of foreign affairs and 
having served in diplomacy for 40 years of course I have friends in 
the MFA and Gul is a very close person with whom I work so in 
any occasion I mention to him what we have achieved. So I am 
sure it is recorded somewhere in the back of his mind and it is also 
recorded to the mind of the foreign officials whom I see from time 
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to time, whom I talk from time to time about the outcome of the 
meetings” 
 
So, from the above statements it is clear that some of the participants have direct 
link with high ranked politicians on both sides.  
 
 Nevertheless, besides the three participants mentioned above, almost all of the 
other participants have also good relations with politicians, with whom they usually 
exchange ideas about what they have learned in the Forum. The overall relation can be 
captured in the words of a Turkish member: 
 
“I inform politicians yes. Sometimes they even call themselves to 
ask how it went. We communicate politicians after each meeting”. 
 
 
7.3.2 Downward transfer 
 
 
 The GTF’s main concern is to influence the political and policy making level. 
However, there are efforts from the group for downward transfer as well, in an effort to 
influence and transmit the new knowledge to as many people as possible albeit of 
secondary importance. In order to achieve maximum downward transfer the Forum and 
the participants individually have used different types of strategies.  
 
 First of all, it is a quite often phenomenon that the Forum uses media in both 
countries. For example the ‘Aegean paper’ was also given to the press, and it was not 
kept secret. Also some top journalists such as, Mehmet Ali Birand, have been peripheral 
members of the wider group. A couple of the people in the core group also are regular 
columnists in newspapers or publish articles periodically. Television shows have also 
been used as a means to transfer especially with the help of the journalists. As a 
participant states: 
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“I also write articles in Hurriet. And there were frequent TV 
interviews, both here and in Athens Greek TV. I appeared several 
times on Greek TV and Karras and Greek colleagues appeared 
many times, Mehmet Ali Birant arranged these interviews 
organized these interviews on one of the most important programs, 
the Manset program…I write twice a week in Hurriet. When I write 
about the GTF sometimes I refer directly to the GTF but off course 
generally” 
 
Thus, media is one of the main channels the GTF tries to transfer knowledge 
downwards. 
 
 Moreover, the initiative used to have a website through which anybody could 
access to the main ideas that were discussed. Even though the website is currently down, 
there is the will from the participants for it to operate again as it was admitted to the 
writer during private talks. The operation of a website shows the will from the 
participants to engage more people and to make public at least some of the issues that 
have been discussed behind the closed doors. This fact can further be proven by the 
statement of a participant. He says about the ideas that the Forum generated: 
 
“We published them in forum’s web site; we also disseminate them 
to journalists and opinion leaders. We organized specific round 
tables with journalists, politicians, business people and we 
presented them the results of this paper. We did everything to 
inform as much as possible people who are interested in Greek 
Turkish relations”. 
 
 The participants also accepted that some of their speeches (for example to 
schools, communities etc) had been influenced by their participation in the Forum, in the 
sense that the new learning they gained in the process was also reflected in their 
speeches. The same thing happened for academic lectures for those who have the chance 
to offer them. Although there are not many concrete examples of these kinds of speeches, 
it is important to mention that the Forum’s participants due to their affiliations have the 
chance to address big groups of people often. However, a representative example could 
be a lecture given by Professor Ustun Erguder at Sabanci University in 2005, where he 
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explained some of the processes that take place in the GTF and compared it to the 
Turkish- Armenian Reconciliation Commission.  
 
 As an ending note on downward transfer, it is important to point out that some of 
the participants, and especially those who do not have direct contact at the policy making 
level, like to underlie the importance of the downward transfer and encourage the group 
for more action in this area. For instance, an academician who is member of the Forum 
says: 
 
“Well, in all fairness I would want them to be more outgoing. 
Public opinion is not as much influenced as I would like to see. 
Publicize the work we do for example. There also arguments 
against it, like GTF is a backchannel. My approach is that we had 
gone too far on that side, we should go more public. Maybe we 
could go more public before the Cyprus referendum. It is an idea. 
The other thing is that we are not developing projects. One of the 
things I liked very much was to bring together youngsters” 
 
 
7.3.3 Lateral transfer 
 
 
 As in the case of the GTJF lateral transfer is not among the priorities of the GTF. 
However, there have been cases that ideas or recommendations have been shared with 
both national or international organizations and other track- two initiatives. One of the 
first members says: 
 
“We had organized events where we invited the other people 
belonging to other organizations or forums to participate. We also 
organized conferences where we invited all NGO’s that deal with 
Greek Turkish relations  and we organized specialized workshop 
for the NGO’s dealing with environmental issues, with human 
security issues, women issues or with more media issues in order 
to help them create links among them and be more efficient in their 
future work” 
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Besides these regional organizations the GTF invites or meets with officials from 
international organizations like the UN, and the EU. The example of the new UN envoy 
in Cyprus who participated in a meeting has already been mentioned, but there are also 
examples from Chairmen of various Parliamentarian Committees who were either invited 
or approached by some of the members.  
 
Finally, lateral transfer is happening through interaction with other grass-root 
organizations and other influential people who are close to the participants. In the first 
case, two think- tanks, the ELIAMEP in Greece and the IPC in Turkey seem to be closely 
affiliated with the initiative. The connection can actually be considered unavoidable since 
the heads of both these think- tanks are also part of the Forum. The second case refers to 
personal interaction the participants might have with friends, their colleagues or their 
communities. All of the participants said that they do try to transfer the new learning 
through this type of interaction as well.  
 
 
7.3.4 Evaluation of transfer 
 
 
 Even though this research is not an evaluative one, some information brought up 
in the interviews should be mentioned in order to show how the participants perceive the 
results of the transfer strategies applied. The main argument here is that the participants 
themselves do not know how much the GTF have influenced the public opinion or the 
official negotiation processes; thus, some of them sound more optimistic than the others. 
Following two passages representing both approaches are provided. A rather pessimist 
participant says: 
 
“I think no, no. I have no illusions. I don’t believe that civil society 
can offer a lot. Not because it has no capacity to do it but because 
after the Ocalan crisis there was  this rapidly rapprochement 
between the two governments from the initiatives taken by the two 
ministers of foreign affairs Mr. Papandreou and Mr. Cem, who 
met in New York in the UN context and a correspondence started  
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between them, which very fast led to negotiations and to 
rapprochement and the signing of some bilateral agreements, and 
at some point I had the impression that the two governments are 
moving faster than us, the private sector. I don’t want to have 
illusions” 
 
On the other hand in another interview it is mentioned: 
 
“It is tempting to say yes (meaning there was an impact) but if you 
ask if it is a seminal event… You know like we did this and that 
happened it is very difficult to say. It is something that is keep 
adding to the flavor a process that goes on, it is very difficult to 
isolate it. For example if the Aegean issue is resolved and then you 
pick up our paper and the way it is resolved has a lot of 
commonalities I would say we had some impacts. If you ask me 
does it worth the effort, yes it worth the effort” 
 
In general the assumption would be that no one from inside the group can really know the 
effects the upward/downward/lateral transfer strategies had. Even the most pessimists 
leave an open window that there might have been some influence on a certain level, and 
the most optimists would always be reluctant to connect an action of the Forum with an 
outcome in the official process.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
CONCLUTIONS 
 
 
 The aim of this work has been to research the cognitive and relational outcomes 
of track –II initiatives. Moreover, the strategies that these initiatives use in order to take 
these outcomes from the micro- level to the macro- level have also been examined. The 
units of analysis have been two different track- II initiatives running in the context of the 
Greek- Turkish relations and working on the Greek- Turkish conflict; the Greek- Turkish 
Forum and the Greek- Turkish Journalists Conference.  
 
 In order for the results of the research to be more concrete a certain path was 
followed. As a first step, the main concepts used were clarified and discussed in the 
literature review chapter so that they are made clear to the reader. Secondly, the 
methodology which led to the collection of data was analyzed. In chapter three the 
initiatives under research were described so that the reader can become familiar with the 
way they function, their organization, their approaches and the main issue they deal with. 
The next chapter was also descriptive, but it concerned the context of the conflict; what 
are the main problems between Turkey and Greece, what are their main arguments and so 
on. Finally, chapters six and seven analyze the data that have been gathered through the 
ways that are explained in the methodology. In the current chapter the results from the 
two initiatives are compared and further assumptions are made. 
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8.1 Cognitive outcomes   
 
 
The final analysis of the data for the two initiatives offers interesting data on how 
the participants of the GTF perceive the learning process through participation and the 
relational products of such initiatives. The results from the questionnaires and the data 
provided by the open- ended questions interview can help reaching an assumption which 
will support or falsify the proposition posed in the beginning. This proposition suggested 
that widespread and positive outcomes should be expected for the participants of the GTF 
and the GTJC as a result of their participation in these initiatives. Indeed, as it can be 
seen from the data analysis both the Forum’s and the Conference’s members perceive 
that they have acquired a lot of new learning and that their relations with the other party 
have been improved.  
  
If the two initiatives are compared to each other the results suggest that there is a 
certain similarity of the perceived relational and cognitive outcomes. Even though the 
limited number of participants does not allow direct comparison between the results of 
the questionnaires, since this could lead to false assumptions, there are some suppositions 
that can be made. To start with, for both the initiatives the learning outcomes concerning 
the other side seem to be very positive, and certainly more positive than all the other 
cognitive outcomes that have been discussed in this paper. The answers to the questions 
that dealt with this type of cognitive outcomes have the highest percentages of positive 
answers, while in three out of the six questions, all the sixteen interviewees have 
answered positively.  
 
As it is made clear from the chart attached to the end of the chapter (chart 3), in 
the type of learning that concerns the other side the percentages of positive answers are 
all above 80% for the sum of the members of the GTF and the GTJC. The percentage 
reaches 100% for the learning about the perspective of the other side and also for the 
learning about the diversity on the other side. The number of positive answers is 
somewhat smaller for the learning about the political needs of the other, since three out of 
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the sixteen people who filled in the questionnaire answered negatively. However, the 
percentage (81%) even in this case can be considered high. 
  
In the rest of the learning categories, as these are defined from the codebook, 
there are also similarities but they are not as obvious as the ones just described. It is clear 
however, that there is not so high consensus among the groups and the negative responses 
seem to be more frequent for both initiatives, although it should be pointed out that in 
these cases also the positive answers are more and the percentage of positive answers 
does not fall below 50%. Moreover, another similarity is that the question with the 
relatively lower amount of answers for both initiatives is the one which concerns the 
learning about new skills. 
  
To be more concrete, in the type of learning that concerns the ‘in-group’ the 
percentages, for the members of both initiatives range, from 62.5% to 81%, with the less 
positive answers given to the question which concerned the political needs of the ‘in-
group’. In this case also it seems that the percentages for the GTF (70-90%) are higher 
than those of the GTJC (33-66%). This variation between the two initiatives can be 
considered expected, assuming that the journalists, because of their affiliation, are always 
well informed about the developments in their own countries.  
 
The results about learning concerning the conflict are also quite high ranging from 
81% to 87,5%. An interesting observation is that although all the members of the GTJC 
said that they have learned new concepts which are related to the conflict, in the case of 
the GTF almost the 20% answered positively. However in the question which asks about 
the tractability of the conflict the results are similar. The results can be explained if the 
affiliations of the GTF members are kept in mind. Most of them were former 
Ambassadors and others are academics so it can be assumed that they are in the position 
to have an in depth knowledge of the issues.  
 
The learning about new skills has the lowest percentages from all other types of 
learning for both of the initiatives. The percentage reaches just 50% in the case of the 
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GTJC and it is somewhat higher for the GTF, reaching 70%. In this case a speculation 
that can be made is that all of the individuals who were interviewed have participated in 
many other conferences and forums, so maybe they have developed these types of skills 
from before. 
 
The similarities described above are also clear in the interviews, so much those of 
the Contact Group members as of the Conference as those of the GTF members. Thus, 
the direct and indirect statements concerning cognitive outcomes related to the other are 
more frequent than the passages from the interviews that refer to other types of learning. 
It seems that learning of the other is the type of learning that the interviewees though they 
should discuss about during the interviews.  
  
Having compared the outcomes of the two initiatives it is also important to 
examine if there are similarities or differences within the groups, meaning mainly the 
responses of the Turks and those of the Greeks. As far as the GTF is concerned, there is 
no apparent differentiation between the responses of the Greek and the Turkish teams. In 
most of the questions about cognitive outcomes both the Turkish and the Greek 
participants showed a positive attitude, and even when there are negative responses these 
come from both groups. For the GTJC there is a similar situation. However, in this case a 
difference can be observed in the answers concerning the new learning about our own 
side. In these questions the Greek members of the Contact Group seemed more reluctant 
to answer positively that their Turkish colleagues. 
  
 
8.2 Relational outcomes 
 
 
As far as the relational outcomes are concerned, there are also great similarities 
between the two initiatives (chart 3). The responses on the questions which looked over 
the relational outcomes had been significantly encouraging, as for both the GTF and the 
GTJC all of the answers have been positive. The results leave no space for 
 124 
misinterpretations; all the individuals that were interviewed and filled in the 
questionnaires perceive that there have gone through relational changes concerning the 
other party, they admitted that they have made new friends though the process and they 
have started to trust the other party more. Moreover, the lack of any negative responses 
makes any comparison between the answers of the Greeks and the Turks pointless, since 
there is an overall agreement between the Greeks and the Turks. In terms of numbers 
100% of the interviewees said that the trust towards the other side has been increased and 
the same percentage said that through the track- II processes they have managed to make 
new friends with individuals from the other side.  
 
The results are interesting for one more reason. As it has been mentioned earlier 
on, the GTJC is more process oriented while the GTF is more outcome oriented. 
However, this differentiation is not reflected on the relational outcomes. Since, the GTF 
is more outcome oriented the absolute positive relational outcomes can be considered as a 
surprise; Moreover, there should be some differentiation with the GTJC which aims to 
create good relations among the participants. The positive relational outcomes of the GTF 
could be explained, if we take under consideration the amount of time that the meetings 
have been held.  
 
The results of this part of the research can provide information about the different 
types of cognitive and relational outcomes that track- II initiatives can have and as such it 
can contribute to the already existing literature (e.g. Cuhadar, 2004; Rouhana, 2000; d’ 
Estree et al, 2001; Broome & Jakobsson-Hatay, 2006).  
 
 
8.3 Transfer strategies 
 
 
As it was made clear in chapter four, the GTF and GTJC have important structural 
differences. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that there are significant differences in 
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the ways the two initiatives try to influence the policy making level and the societal level, 
and also important disparities on the orientations of transfer that the two initiatives have.  
 
Starting from the GTF, based on the data collected and introduced in chapter 
seven, the Forum is a political track- II initiative which mainly focuses on upward 
transfer, trying to influence the decision making level and offer proposals for resolution 
on the conflict that the policy makers can take under consideration. The GTF manages to 
do so mainly by delivering ideas to politicians and keeping close direct connections with 
the policy making level. Downward transfer also exists, mainly through media public 
interaction and internet, but is seems that the main orientation is to influence to policy 
makers and the politicians.  
 
Concretely as it can be seen in the table at the end of this chapter (Table 4) the 
Forum has been using all of the transfer strategies that were included in the questionnaire. 
Moreover, the data show that these strategies have been used quite often with the goal of 
maximizing the possible influence at the policy making and the decision making level. As 
the GTF is an initiative which holds an advisory role for the policy makers, certainly the 
results can be considered expected. What is surprising, however, is that the GTF and its 
members have also used several of the transfer strategies that were included in the 
questionnaire but they concerned downward transfer. 
 
On the other hand, the GTJC presents a different image. The main goal of the 
Conference is to have an impact on the public opinion through the change of the 
journalists’ attitudes in both countries. As a journalist initiative this is the main 
orientation; diminish nationalistic ideas in the media coverage and have appositive 
impact on the public opinion. In addition, as it was discussed in the data analysis part it 
seems that the GTJC does not use any of the transfer strategies for upward transfer. The 
connection with the politicians exists but there is no upward transfer. This can also be 
seen in  3, where it is clear that the GTJC did not use any of the transfer strategies that for 
example the GTF used, for upward transfer.    
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The data on downward transfer for the Conference are also interesting. It seems 
that the GTJC was very reluctant to use some of the strategies that could address the big 
mass of people (e.g. websites, press conferences). The speculation that can be made is 
that the organizers were counting on the mainly participants for the downward transfer. In 
other words they probably believed that if they can create a positive atmosphere between 
the Greek and the Turkish journalists then they will have create a great asset for 
downward transfer. Therefore, other strategies have not been used. 
 
 The results of the part of the research offers examples of how track two 
initiatives can plan upward, downward and lateral transfer. The results can contribute to 
already existing literature which looks into specific track- II initiatives and examines the 
transfer strategies that were used in each case; for instance Irani’s work on the Maryland 
problem solving Forums (2005), Bartoli’s work on the Mozambique peace process 
(2005), Saunders’ work on the Tajikistan case and Cuhadar’s research on the Israeli- 
Palestinian case (2004). 
 
 
8.4 Implications for future research 
  
 
 The current thesis offers valuable information on how people involved in two 
specific track- II initiatives perceive the changes that they have experienced as a result of 
their participation in these initiatives. The assumptions reached and discussed throughout 
the thesis, however, can not be generalized so as to cover other initiatives no matter how 
similar they might seem either to the Greek- Turkish Forum or the Greek- Turkish 
Journalists’ Conference. In every track- II initiative there is a number of inputs. Each one 
of these inputs may or may not influence the process in a positive or negative way and 
have an impact on the cognitive and relational outcomes. Some of these inputs are for 
example, the number of participants, the third party, the goals that the third party sets at 
the beginning and so on. 
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 Nevertheless, this research also gives some stimuli for further research. For 
example it would be interesting to see if the results would be the same if the rest of the 
journalists, meaning the ones who just participate, were also interviewed. This type of 
research could offer some information on the differences in outcomes between the people 
in the Contact Group, and the rest of the participants who were not so closely linked to 
the initiative. For the case of the GTF the same could happen if a future research includes 
the people who participate occasionally and not only the core group members.  
 
 Moreover, this thesis examines the cognitive and relational outcomes of the GTJC 
and the GTF, because looking into the actual changes requires a pretest. However, if a 
researcher has the time and resources it would be very interesting to examine the actual 
changes that the participants of the GTF and the members of the Contact Group of the 
Conference went through. This is possible if for example older articles, other writings 
and statements of all these people are compared with those which were written after the 
initiative had established.   
  
 Finally, as far as the transfer part is concerned, an evaluative research which 
would examine the impact of the transfer strategies, on the society or the policy making 
level, is the next step. This type of research could answer questions concerning, which 
transfer strategies are more suitable and to what context.   
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Table 4:   
 
    GTF GTJC 
Invite politicians or policy 
makers to the meetings  YES 
NO (only for ceremonial 
purposes) 
Delivering ideas/ 
recommendations to 
policymakers  YES NO 
Representation in official 
negotiations by one of the 
members  YES NO 
 
Up
w
a
rd
s 
Contacting and discussing the 
new knowledge/ideas with 
politicians YES NO 
Participants giving speeches 
 (at schools, communities, 
media etc) YES YES 
Participants giving interviews 
(at schools, communities, 
media etc)  YES YES 
Giving (joint) press-
conferences  NO NO 
Interaction with grassroots 
organizations (NGO’s) YES (rarely) YES (once) 
Publishing (joint) articles in 
newspapers  YES (not joint) YES 
Giving academic lectures (in 
universities, workshops etc)  YES YES 
Publishing ideas/ initiative on 
the websites  YES (in the past) NO (planned) 
 
D
o
w
n
w
a
rd
s 
Interaction with 
Colleagues/Friends/Community  YES YES 
Sharing 
ideas/recommendations with 
national/regional organizations  YES YES 
Sharing 
ideas/recommendations with 
international organizations  YES NO La
te
ra
l  
Cooperation with other similar 
track-II initiatives YES NO 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
Interview protocol: 
1. Can you tell me about the second track project that you participated in with the 
Greeks/Turks on the Greek-Turkish conflict? (general information about the 
meetings) 
This question can be followed up with these questions if necessary: 
 
a) What was the nature of the projects in terms of issues addressed?  
b) What were you trying to accomplish in these meetings? 
c) How did you go about this effort? What were the actions involved? (Meetings? 
When? What was the agenda? Who were the participants? Where? How were they 
facilitated?) 
d) Who was involved in the project? 
 
 
2. What did you know about the people at the meetings? How did you recognize 
them and their affiliations? Was everybody of equal/similar in status? 
(relationship/implementation)  
 
3. When you first came together in the meetings, did you have any past relations 
with any of the other participants? (changes in relation) 
 
4. Did the project change your views about the Greeks/Turks? Why? Why not? 
(changes in relation) 
 
5. Do you think there are Greeks/Turks that you can work with after this project? 
(changes in relations) 
 
6. What did you learn in these meetings/this project? (changes in representation) 
 
7. Do you think the project generated anything new about the Greek-Turkish 
conflict? If so, what? If not, why not? (changes in representation) 
 
8. Did the meetings/project change your views about the Greek-Turkish conflict? In 
what ways? (changes in representation) 
 
9. Were there any concrete results of these meetings? What were they? Did these 
results satisfy your initial goals? (Was this what you had in mind?) What did you 
do with these results? (foundations for transfer/implementation) 
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10. Did the group come up with a plan for the next step after the workshops?  
(foundations for transfer/implementation)  
a. Did you publicize the results?   
b. To whom?  
c. How? 
d. What kind of strategies/ methods did you use to convey the results from 
the meetings? 
e. Do you think that this method worked?  
f. Who was interested in knowing about what happened in the meetings 
and/or the project? 
 
11. Do you think your efforts had an impact on the Greek-Turkish conflict? Why? 
Why not? (foundations for transfer) 
 
12. Do you think the project influenced the political process and official negotiations? 
If yes, why? How? What would you do differently to influence the political 
process and negotiations at that time? (foundations for transfer/implementation)  
 
 
13. Did any of the participants in the meetings communicate directly with official 
policymakers and consult with them? Did the participants who made these 
contacts have relationships with the policymakers? If yes, can you tell me what 
kind of relationship was that? (foundations for transfer/implementation) 
 
14. Did any of the people from the meetings take on an official/political position 
during the formal negotiations related to Greek-Turkish relations? (foundations 
for transfer/implementation) 
 
 
15. Based on your experience, what do you think worked and did not work? What 
would you do differently to influence the political process and negotiations at that 
time? What would your advice be to others doing similar work? 
 
16. Can you tell me briefly about other similar efforts on Greek-Turkish relations that 
you are aware of at the time you were involved with this project? Are there any 
similar efforts going on now? (coordination/information) 
 
a. Do you think other similar efforts on the Greek-Turkish conflict have 
impacted your efforts? Positively or negatively? How? 
b. Do you ever coordinate your efforts? In what way? With whom?  
c. What kind of influence do you think other similar efforts had on the 
political process and negotiations? 
 
17. Is there anything important that you would like to add?  
 
 
 132 
APPENDIX 2 
 
Questionnaire on relational and cognitive changes: 
 Yes Learning/Change  
 
 Positive Negative   No 
Understanding the others perspective       
Understand the other’s political 
dynamics        
Learn the political needs of the other       
Understand the other’s political and 
social constraints       
Understand the diversity on the other 
side        
Learn more about Track-II processes 
and their ability to contribute to conflict 
resolution  
      
Understand the political needs of our 
side        
Understand the political/social 
constraints of our side          
Understand the diversity of our side        
Trust toward the other side         
Developed friendship with people from 
the other side         
That a solution to the conflict is 
possible        
Learning new skills (e.g. Policy 
analysis skills, technical skills)        
Understand and analyze new 
concepts that can be useful to 
understand the conflict        
Learning that the other side is more 
sophisticated than thought        
 
 
Yes (positive): contributed in a positive way  
Yes (negative): contributed in a negative way 
No: Did not contribute at all 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Questionnaire on transfer: 
  
 Strategies Used in the Initiative   YES NO  WHEN (if yes)  
Invite politicians or policy makers to the 
meetings  
      
Delivering ideas/ recommendations to 
policymakers  
      
Representation in official negotiations 
by one of the members        U
pw
ar
ds
 
Contacting and discussing the new 
knowledge/ideas with politicians       
Participants giving speeches  (at 
schools, communities, media etc)       
Participants giving interviews (at 
schools, communities, media etc)        
Giving (joint) press-conferences        
Interaction with grassroots 
organizations (NGO’s)       
Publishing (joint) articles in 
newspapers        
Giving academic lectures (in 
universities, workshops etc)        
Publishing ideas/ initiative on the 
websites        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
o
w
n
w
a
rd
s 
Interaction with 
Colleagues/Friends/Community        
Sharing ideas/recommendations with 
national/regional organizations  
      
Sharing ideas/recommendations with 
international organizations  
      La
te
ra
l 
Cooperation with other similar track-II 
initiatives       
 
 
Yes: means the tactic is used  
No: means the tactic is no used  
When: When the tactic was used (year, stage of the project etc) 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Codebook: 
Cognitive Changes 
 
1) New learning concerning the conflict 
Description: participants learn about the details of the conflict and also learn to analyze 
concepts that can be useful for understanding the conflict better. It also includes any 
knowledge that concerns change in perceptions of tractability or solvability of the 
conflict.  
 
Indicators for supportive qualitative data: 
• Direct verbal expressions (e.g. I learned that the Greek- Turkish conflict can be 
solved) that suggest new learning about the conflict or better understanding of 
concepts related to the specific conflict 
• Indirect verbal expressions by the participants implying they have learned more 
about the conflict through their participation in the initiative (e.g. I believe that 
participation has helped me see the problems between the Turks and the Greeks 
clearer) 
 
2) New learning about the other side  
Description: participants begin to understand the other side better and they are in the 
position to comprehend more different levels of the other’s entity, like political level or 
social level 
 
Indicators for supportive qualitative data: 
• Interviewees state that their participation helped them understand the other’s 
perspective 
• Interviewees mention that they have learned more about the political needs of the 
other 
• Interviewees mention that their participation has helped them understand the 
other’s political and social constrains 
• Interviewees state that they have distinguished diversities on the other side 
• Interviewees mention better comprehension of the others political dynamics 
 
3) New learning about our side 
Description: participants begin to understand their own side better and they are in a 
position to comprehend more different levels of their own entity, like political level or 
social level. 
 
Indicators for supportive qualitative data: 
• Interviewees mention that they have learned more about the political needs of 
their side 
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• Interviewees mention that their participation has helped them understand the 
political and social constrains of their side 
• Interviewees state that they have distinguished diversities on the their side 
• Interviewees talk about better understanding of the political dynamics of their side 
 
 
4) New learning about track- II initiatives 
Description: participants start to comprehend how exactly track- II processes work and 
what are their strengths and limitations in conflict resolution processes 
 
Indicators for supportive qualitative data: 
• Direct verbal expressions (e.g. I learned how track- II initiatives can contribute to 
conflict resolution) which indicate learning concerning track- II processes 
• Indirect verbal expressions (e.g. my participation helped me realize how helpful 
these type of initiatives can be) 
 
5) Learning concerning new skills 
Description: participants through the process learn new skills, like policy analysis skills, 
or improve their skills in a specific area like negotiation skills 
 
Indicators for supportive qualitative data: 
• Direct verbal expressions (e.g. my participation helped me improve my active 
listening abilities) from the participants on how they acquired or improved skills 
through participation in track- II  initiatives 
• Indirect verbal expressions (e.g. these types of initiatives may be useful for 
someone in order to improve some skills) suggesting that this type of knowledge 
is possible to be gained through participation in track- II initiatives 
 
Relational outcomes 
 
1) Trust 
Description: participants begin to understand the other participants within or outside the 
context of the meetings. 
 
Indicators for supportive qualitative data: 
• Direct verbal manifestations from a participant (e.g. I started to trust participant 
X) which reveal a feeling of trust being him/her and another participant 
• Indirect verbal manifestations from a participant which may imply feelings of 
trust have been developed 
 
2) Friendship 
Description: feelings of friendship being created among the participants; participants 
making new friends in the meetings. 
 
Indicators for supportive qualitative data 
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• Direct verbal manifestation from a participant (e.g. I have made good friends with 
participant X) which reveal friendship with other participants from the same 
initiative 
• Indirect verbal manifestation (e.g. after all these years of cooperation me and X 
have become very close) from a participant which imply friendship being 
developed with other participants from the same initiatives 
 
3) Other relational outcomes 
Description: any outcome from the participation in the initiatives that can have relational 
prolongation, like empathy 
 
Indicators for supportive qualitative data 
• Direct verbal expression of a new feeling which is a direct outcome of the 
participation in the initiative (e.g. I started feeling empathy for the other group) 
and it is not covered above 
• Indirect verbal expression concerning changes to the relations among the 
participants 
 
Transfer Strategies 
 
1) Upward transfer 
Description: actions which show that there was transfer of learning to the policymaking 
level 
 
Indicators for supportive quantitative data 
• Direct or indirect expression which indicates sharing of ideas with politicians/ 
policy makers 
• Direct or indirect expression explains interaction with politicians or policy makers 
• Direct or indirect expression which reveal any other connection with the 
politicians or policymakers 
 
2) Downward transfer 
Description: actions which show that there was transfer of learning to the societal level or 
the public opinion 
 
Indicators for supportive quantitative data 
• Direct or indirect expression of actions aiming to influence the societal level or 
the public opinion, such as Conferences, websites, speeches etc 
 
3) Lateral transfer 
Description: actions which suggest transfer of learning and interaction with other track- 
two initiatives 
• Direct or indirect expression which show interaction with other track- two 
initiatives 
• Direct or indirect expression which show interaction with regional or international 
organizations 
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